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ABSTRACT
Three experiments investigated the effect of various
kinds of reflection (within-task and post-task reflection)
on learning a process control task.

Also, two ways of

providing learners with alternative ideas about task
behavior, exposure to other's ideas and providing hints for
task solution, were examined.

The task involved a

simulated "sugar production factory" in which the learners
sought to control sugar production by manipulating
workforce size.

It was predicted that combining within-

task reflection with exposure to alternative task ideas
would lead to superior task performance through integration
of experiential and reflective knowledge.

Contrary to the

prediction, within-task reflection consistently interfered
with learning and knowledge integration by causing learners
to acquire overly general and invalid rules (reflective
knowledge) about the relations among task variables.

These

results were interpreted as evidence of a fundamental
tendency (reflective abstraction error) of people to seek
simple relations among variables in complex systems when
engaged in within-task reflection.

The most efficient

learning occurred when reflection was discouraged during
task performance, learners were given access to alternative
ideas about task behavior, and they were given an
opportunity to discuss their task experiences with other
learners post-task.
vi
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INTRODUCTION

A long-standing view of many investigators of learning
is that people acquire and apply knowledge and skills in
two distinct and possibly complementary ways (e.g.,
Anderson, 1982, 1983; Berry & Dienes, 1993, Broadbent,
Fitzgerald, & Broadbent, 1986; Brooks, 1978; Cho & Mathews,
1996; Elio & Anderson, 1984; Kolers & Roediger, 1984;
Lazarus, 1991; Lewicki, 1986; Mathews, Buss, Stanley,
Blanchard-Fields, Cho, & Druhan, 1989; Reber, 1993) .

One

kind of knowledge is direct, not mediated by reflective
thought processes such as planning or reasoning.

Instead,

decisions and actions based on this knowledge are made
intuitively, without reflection, and are determined to a
great degree by environmental stimuli

(Brooks, 1978;

Lewicki, 1986; Norman, 1993; Reber, 1989, 1993).
The term used to refer to this kind of knowledge varies
depending upon the theoretical position of the researcher.
Among the various terms used are procedural

(e.g.,

Anderson, 1976, 1983), nonanalytic (Brooks, 1978) ,
instance-based (Logan, 1988), memory-based (e.g., Mathews
et al., 1989), implicit (e.g., Reber 1989, 1993),
unselective (Hayes & Broadbent, 1988), and experiential
(Norman, 1993) .

The key attribute of knowledge that is

shared by all of these conceptions is that of minimal
conscious mediation.

That is, knowledge of this type

relies heavily on environmental cues to activate the
1
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relevant knowledge; it is highly stimulus-bound.

Thus,

performance based on this kind of knowledge can be
relatively fast and effortless because little reflection is
required.
Norman's term, experiential knowledge, will be used
herein because it makes the fewest claims about mechauiisms
underlying knowledge use.

A good example of experiential

knowledge can be seen in the skill of a chess master
scanning the chess board for possible moves.

The pattern

of chess pieces, as perceived by the player, immediately
suggests or affords possible moves.

Thus, experiential

knowledge influences behavior largely through its effect on
perception (e.g.. Chase & Simon, 1973; Gibson, 1979;
Perruchet & Gallego, 1997).
Experiential knowledge is not taught but is acquired
through direct experience (e.g., Gibson,

1979).

Furthermore, it is suited best for action, not
communication.

It may be difficult to express one's

experiential knowledge.

For example, knowledge engineers

involved in constructing expert systems have long struggled
with the problem of extracting from experts everything they
know about their particular area of expertise (Hoffman,
1987).
Contrast this experiential Icnowledge with reflective
knowledge.

Reflective knowledge is suited ideally for

thinking and communicating rather than action.

When one

2
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performs a task using reflective knowledge (e.g., following
a recipe), the performance is mediated by reflection, as
opposed to the use of experiential knowledge which is
immediate (Anderson, 1982, 1983; Norman, 1993).
By definition, reflective knowledge is accessible to
consciousness.

In fact, in the scientific community it is

the primary meauis of communication.

The theory is the

quintessential example of reflective knowledge.

Reflective

Icnowledge is suited ideally for an existence in the public
space where ideas are developed and refined.
The very quality which gives reflective knowledge its
power, its abstractness, can also be its weakness.
Reflective knowledge may be misapplied because the
conditions of its use may have been abstracted away.

It is

incomplete because it is abstract and therefore missing
many possibly important details

(Ornstein & Ehrlich, 1989).

Even though the abstract quality of reflective knowledge
should enable transfer across domains, it's very
abstractness may actually prevent it from being accessed in
relevant situations.

The literature on analogical transfer

demonstrates the difficulty of transferring reflective
knowledge (e.g., Catrambone & Holyoak, 1989; Gick &
Holyoak, 1980).

Typically, one must be told of the

relevance of one's knowledge for the transfer problem.
Otherwise, no transfer occurs.
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The kind of thinking required of reflective knowledge
may demand too much of people's limited capacity memory and
attention (Hayes & Broadbent, 1988; Miller, 1956).

The

m o d e m development of cognitive artifacts ranging from
paper and pencil to computer applications used for decision
support is testimony to the difficulty of reflective
thinking as well as its importance.
The complementary nature of experiential and reflective
knowledge suggests that integrating the two would be
beneficial for learning and transfer.

For example, the

context-bound character of experiential knowledge could
help ground reflective knowledge and prevent its
misapplication or over-generalization.

Conversely,

reflective knowledge could facilitate the transfer of
experiential knowledge into novel but related situations.
These positive outcomes of combining experiential and
reflective knowledge have not been born out by studies,
however.

As a subsequent literature review will show,

successful integration of the two kinds of knowledge is not
easily achieved.

Learners tend to default to experiential

modes of thinking when reflective strategies fall into
difficulty (Berry & Dienes, 1993; Reber, 1993).

Also, when

learning to perform complex tasks, learners may acquire
invalid reflective knowledge in the form of mental models
or verbalizable rules that lead to less than optimal
performance (Reber, 1976; Reber, Kassin, Lewis, & Cantor,
4
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1980).

Finally, dissociations between experiential and

reflective knowledge may occur, particularly in situations
where the rules governing task behavior are not salient
(Berry & Broadbent, 1984; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).
Understanding how and when integration fails or
succeeds can lead to improvements in methods of training
and educating amd increase our basic understanding of
learning and transfer.

The intent of this study was to

investigate how learning and transfer is affected by
encouraging various kinds of within-task and post-task
reflection and by giving learners access to alternative
ideas about how to perform a task.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
This literature review focuses on the effects of
explicit or reflective processes on the resulting
knowledge, performance, and transfer for tasks in which
dissociations (i.e., lack of integration) frequently have
been reported.

The studies to be discussed used three

methods for eliciting reflective thinking:

(1) instructing

participants to discover the rules or structure that
determines the behavior of the task variables;

(2)

providing explicit instruction or information about the
rules that relate task variables; and (3) requiring
participants to verbalize as they perform the task.
Following the discussion of the literature, the
implications of these findings for the integration of
knowledge will be discussed.

Finally, the results of three

experiments will be presented.
Effects of Rule Search Instructions
One way to investigate the influence of reflective
thought on experiential learning is to instruct
participants to attempt to figure out the rules governing
the behavior of the task.
have been mixed.

The results of this approach

The effect of rule search instructions

has ranged from decreasing the level of learning (e.g..
Berry & Broadbent, 1988; Howard & Balias, 1980; Reber,
1976; Reber et al., 1980) to having no effect (Dienes,
Broadbent, & Berry, 1991; Dulany, Carlson, & Dewey, 1984),
6
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or improving learning (Berry & Broadbent/ 1988; Reber et
al./ 1980).

The particular effect those rule-search

instructions produce seems to be related to the salience of
the rules governing the task (Berry & Broadbent, 1988;
Mathews et al., 1989; Reber et al., 1980).
Reber et al.

(1980) investigated the effect of salience

on people's ability to learn an artificial grammar.

Reber

and his colleagues presented half of their participants
with training stimuli arranged randomly in an array to make
less salient the common features (i.e., patterns of letters
in grammatical exemplars) that could be used to facilitate
rule learning.

Stimuli for the remaining participants were

ordered in a way that maximized the salience of common
features.

Learning was measured by requiring participants

to classify new stimuli as valid or invalid according to
the rules.

These authors reported that rule search

instructions reduced learning in the random presentation
condition only.

A more fine-grained analysis of the data

showed that participants in the random presentation
conditions tended repeatedly to misclassify stimuli that
were presented more than once during test.

This suggested

that the participants had acquired invalid rules which they
were using to incorrectly classify certain stimuli.

Thus,

the likelihood of acquiring invalid knowledge can be
increased if stimulus structure is difficult to detect and
explicit processing, such as rule-search, is invoked.
7
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When the rules governing relations among the stimuli
are salient or easy to discover, rule-search instructions
can have a positive effect on learning (Mathews et al.,
1989; Lee, 1995; Reber et al., 1980).

Mathews et al.

(1989) used a biconditional artificial grammar built from a
set of correspondence rules described below.

This grammar

generated letter-strings consisting of eight consonants,
with a dot separating the first and last four letters
(e.g., "SCCT.VPPX").

There were no constraints on the four

letters to the left of the dot, except that they had to be
from the set of letters reserved for the grammar.

The

correspondence rules specified which letters must occur in
corresponding positions in the left and right halves of the
string.

For example, S goes with V, C with P, and so on.

Thus, in the example above, an S in the first position
requires a V in the corresponding position in the right
half of the string.
One likely effect of the correspondence rules was that
salient patterns such as repeated letters, "SCCC.VPPP" for
example, focused the learner on the relationships across
the left and right halves of the strings.

This made it

more likely that learners would discover the rules.

Two

training tasks were used to elicit either an explicit rulediscovery strategy or an implicit exemplar memorization
strategy.

Learning by participants in the rule-discovery

condition was superior to that of participants in the
8
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exemplar memorization conditions.

This finding is

consistent with the claim of Reber et al. (1980) that rulesearch would be successful only when the rules are easy to
discover.
Rule-search instructions do not always affect
performance in implicit learning tasks (Dulauiy et al.,
1984; Lee, 1995; Mathews et al., 1989).

In learning tasks

involving rules that are extremely difficult to find,
participants are likely to fall back on an implicit or
experiential mode to guide their performance (e.g.. Berry &
Dienes, 1993; Reber, 1993).

The deliberate engagement in

reflective or explicit thinking is effortful and less fun
than experientially performing the task (Ericsson, Krampe,
& Tesch-Romer, 1993) or being in flow (Csikszentmihalyi,
1990) .

Learners know that progress can often be made by

mere repetition of the task, without reflective thinking.
Thus, there is a strong natural tendency to perform a task
without attempting effortful reflective strategies.
Effects of Providing Explicit Instruction
A few studies have provided specific information to
participants about the nature of the rules underlying the
task (Berry & Broadbent, 1984; Reber et al., 1980; Stanley,
Mathews, Buss, & Kotler-Cope, 1989).

Berry & Broadbent

(1984) used the sugar production task in which participants
attempted to reach a specified target sugar production
level in a computer simulated sugar refinery by
9
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manipulating the size of the workforce employed at the
refinery.

Sugar production and workforce size were related

by a simple mathematical equation.

On each of a series of

trials, the con^uter displayed the current sugar
production.

The participants were required to input the

size of a work force they thought necessary to reach the
target production level.

Then they received immediate

feedback about the actual production level achieved.
One aim of Berry cind Broadbent's (1984) study was to
find out if verbal instruction on how to reach the target
would affect task performance and verbalizable knowledge
similarly.

They found that verbal instruction improved

their participants' ability to answer questions about task
behavior but it had no effect on their ability to control
sugar production, except when combined with a requirement
to verbally justify each response.
Stanley et al.,

(1989), also used the sugar production

task to investigate the effect of several kinds of
instruction such as exemplar memorization, providing a
simple heuristic, rule instruction, and providing written
transcripts gathered from subjects "thinking aloud" as they
performed the task.

Stanley et al.,

(1989) found a small

but statistically significant benefit from all of these
instruction types relative to a control condition.
Interestingly, performance in rule instruction conditions
was no better than in exemplar memorization conditions even
10
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though it provided the participants with reflective
knowledge sübout relations among task variables.

This is

consistent with the hypothesis of separate kinds of
knowledge.

Verbal instruction primarily influences

reflective knowledge whereas task performance is based
primarily on knowledge gained through task experience
(experiential knowledge).

Sometimes, even perfect

reflective knowledge of task behavior can be useless
without real task experience (Reber & Millward, 1968).
Effects of Verbalization
Another way to encourage participants to think and
reflect as they l e a m is to require them to think out loud
and report their reasoning as they perform the task.

It

has been suggested that the requirement to verbalize while
learning a task might improve learning by maintaining the
learner's focus on the relevant variables, assuming the
relevant variables are salient or likely to be selected by
the learner (Berry & Broadbent, 1984).

Berry and Broadbent

(1984) reported that concurrent verbalization was not
effective in improving learning in a complex control task
(e.g., sugar production task).

However, their experiments

lacked a proper nonverbalizing control.

Subsequent

investigations, using similar tasks, showed verbalization
to cause a small but positive increase in the level of
learning (McGeorge & Burton, 1989; Stanley et al., 1989).

11
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It is difficult to interpret the results of these
studies because the methods of eliciting verbalization
differed widely across studies.

Berry and Broadbent’s

(1984) participants were asked to give a reason for each
response as they interacted with the task.

McGeorge and

Burton (1989) asked their participants to describe any
rules or heuristics they were using.

In both of these

studies participants verbalized concurrently with task
performance.

By contrast, the participants in the

experiments of Stanley et al. (1989) verbalized
instructions for an unseen partner to perform the task
after each ten interactions with the task.
That these different methods all led to improved
performance (except Berry & Broadbent) suggests that any
kind of verbalization is sufficient for improvement in
performance.

However, some findings from problem solving

research suggest that some forms of verbalization are
better than others

(Berardi-Colleta, Buyer, Dominowski, &

Rellinger, 1995).

Berardi-Coletta et al.

(1995)

hypothesized that problem solving would be enhanced only
when participants engaged in "metacognitive processing."
They described metacognitive processing as a reflective
process of attending to what one is doing to solve the
problem (process-focused) rather than focusing on aspects
of the problem (problem-focused) .

Berardi-Colleta et al.

(1995) elicited process-focused behavior by periodically
12
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prompting their participants to justify and evaluate their
actions.

Problem-focused behavior was elicited by having

participants periodically report on various aspects of the
problem (e.g., the goal or the current problem state) .
support of their hypothesis, Berardi-Colleta et al.

In

(1995)

found that problem solving performance was superior for
participants in process-focused conditions, relative to
problem-focused conditions.

Berardi-Colleta et al.

(1995)

also reported that process-focused participants were more
likely to change their strategies and problem
representations when these were found to be inadequate for
problem solution.

By contrast, problem-focused

participants persisted in inefficient strategies and
problem representations.
Other investigations have found problem solving
performance to be positively related to engagement in self
dialogue or generating explanations about task behavior
(Biemiller & Meichenbaum, 1992; Chi, Bassock, Lewis,
Reimann, & Glaser, 1987; Chi, DeLeeuw, Chiu, & LaVarcher,
1994) .

For example, Chi et al.

(1987) collected think-

aloud protocols of students studying example problems.
They found that better problem solvers generated more
statements indicative of self-monitoring and self
explanation, absolutely and proportionally, than poor
problem solvers.

Also, the number of self-monitoring and

self-explanation statements correlated highly with problem
13
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solving performance.

More recently, Chi et al.

(1994)

reported that participants prompted for self-explanations
showed greater understanding of studied materials than
participants not so prompted.
Siimmarv and Implications of F.Tnr»i rical Findings

There are several key findings that bear on the problem
of integrating experiential and reflective knowledge.
First, reliance on experiential modes of thinking and
experiential knowledge is a default strategy when
reflective strategies run into difficulty (Reber, 1993).
Second, when the task is structured so that the rules and
relevant variables are not salient and quality feedback is
missing, learners often end up with invalid reflective
knowledge or mental models
et al., 1980).

(Hayes & Broadbent,

1988; Reber

Further, these invalid models are often

resistant to challenge or change (Berardi-Colleta et al.,
1995; Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, & Thagard, 1986).

Third,

providing reflective knowledge, in the form of instruction,
tends to affect the learner's mental model and leave
experiential knowledge unaffected (Berry & Broadbent,
1984).

Last, thinking êibout one's knowledge (i.e.,

process-focused) in relation to evidence (experiential
knowledge) rather than thinking with it (e.g., problemfocused) is most likely lead to revision of one's model
(Berardi-Colleta et al., 1995; Kuhn, 1989).

14

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

These findings suggest three conditions necessary for
integration of reflective and experiential knowledge:

(1)

Provide support for reflective thinking so learners will
not default to experiential mode,

(2) provide exposure to

alternative task conceptions (mental models) along with
accurate and timely feedback for evaluating models, and (3)
provide an environment for learners to think ahmit- their
models in relation to the task as they practice.
Support for Reflective Thinking
Relying on experiential knowledge requires fewer
resources than reflecting on and reasoning from a mental
model of the task.

Performing a task in experiential mode

requires only attending to the task; the task itself
provides the retrieval cues for past solutions.

In

contrast, performing in reflective mode requires
maintaining in conscious memory a model of the task (see
Norman, 1993 for a persuasive argument about the extra
effort required for reflection).

Thus, some kind of

support for reflection might lessen the tendency to fall
back on experiential strategies for learning.

However,

merely instructing participants to learn reflectively will
likely fail.

Therefore, the reflection must be "built in"

to the learning task.
Exposure to Alternative Models
When learners do seek rules governing task behavior or
otherwise build a mental model of the task, and there is a
15
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lack of timely and accurate feedback, the resulting rules
or model can be flawed.

Task experience is not sufficient

to cause revision of the learner's model for a number of
reasons.

In some cases there may be insufficient or

unreliable data for modifying the model

(Brehmer, 1980) .

At times, repeated task experience may entrench one's model
and block solution of problems easily solved otherwise
(e.g., Luchins, 1942).

At other times, one's model may

resist repeated opportunities for change by creating
"exception rules"

(Holland et al., 1986) .

Thus, an

increasing level of experience is not necessarily
associated with an increasing correctness of one's model.
Regardless of the quality of the data confronting their
mental models, people most often are biased toward evidence
that confirms their model (e.g., Wason,

1968) .

Therefore,

the learner is unlikely to revise a faulty model or to
consider alternatives

(cf., Kareev & Avrahami, 1995).

Learners also may lack reflective skills.

Rather than

reflecting about their models and the relevant evidence,
individuals lacking reflective skills might reflect with
their models (Kuhn, 1989).

Thus, the model is never a

candidate for modification as it is largely invisible to
the thinker.
Overcoming these obstacles to successful model revision
is necessary for integrating reflective and experiential
knowledge.

To achieve this the learner must be encouraged
16
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to consider alternative models and must have available
accurate and timely feedback about the quality of each
model.
Thinking About Instead of Thinking With
There is no guarantee however that providing
alternative models along with accurate feedback will have
the desired result.

It is possible that providing this

extra support to learners will affect reflective knowledge
only, leaving experiential knowledge, and therefore task
performance, untouched.

This might be prevented by

providing a means for learners to use their reflective
knowledge, and reflect on that knowledge, as they practice
the task (acquire experiential knowledge) .
A recent investigation of Mathews et al.

(1996), using

the sugar production task, tested a procedure devised to
meet the three conditions just discussed.

The procedures

used by Mathews et al. (1996) included group discussions
among learners to formulate explicit models of task
performance.

The participants were required to express

their explicit models in the form of a written policy for
performing the task.

The group discussions were expected

to provide participants with an opportunity for reflection
about their models and to make available alternative models
(from other group members) .

Additionally, Mathews et al.

(1996) gave feedback to learners about the quality of their

17
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explicit models thereby raising the quality of evidence
available to learners for evaluating their models.
Mathews et al. (1996) also incorporated a reflective
practice procedure designed to facilitate integration of
the learners’ mental models with their experiential
knowledge.

This was predicted to reduce the dissociation

between reflective and experiential knowledge.

These

procedures produced substantial inqjrovement in performance
when the participants received all of these treatments.
The current investigation attempted to replicate and extend
the work of Mathews et al-

(1996) .

Therefore,

the findings

of Mathews et al. (1996) will be discussed in some detail
below.
S u m m a ry of Mathews et al. (1996)

The task used by Mathews et al. (1996) is a dynamic
systems control task in which participants learn to control
sugar output in a computer simulated sugar production
factory (Berry & Broadbent, 1984, 1988).

Briefly,

participants interact with a computer-based simulation of a
sugar production factory.

The task requires participants

to control the level of sugar production by setting the
level of work force.

Sugar production is computed as a

function of sugar production on the previous trial and work
force on the current trial.
production to work force is

The equation relating sugar
= (20 X W) - Pq + N .

P^ is the
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sugar production output ranging from 1000 to 12000.

Pq is

the sugar production level at the beginning of the trial
and W is the number of workers entered by the participant.
W ranges from 100 to 1200.

N is a random element that is

added to the sugar production output.

This value is

randomly selected on each trial from the values 1000, 0,
and -1000.

The random element functions to make the

relation between production and workforce less salient.
Sugar production is not allowed to exceed 12000 tons nor go
below 1000 tons.

In those cases where a participant's

response results in sugar production outside of this range,
the production output is truncated to the appropriate
maximum or minimum value.

Each time the participant

chooses and enters a value for work force, the computer
calculates the new sugar production level and displays it
on the computer screen.
Mathews et al.

(1996) introduced a novel reflective

practice procedure to force participants to think about the
relation between their reflective knowledge (as represented
in their written strategies or policies) and how they
actually performed the task.

During the interval between

practice sessions, Mathews et al. evaluated each policy via
computer simulation.

The results of the simulations were

then used to provide feedback to the participants about the
quality and behavior of their policies.

On each trial,
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participants were required to predict how many workers
their written policy would use (as determined by the
simulation), and what particular rule of their policy would
be employed to set worker level on that trial.

Then, they

were given an opportunity to suggest a different worker
level that might get them closer to the target level of
output.

Following their responses, they received feedback

on what level of workers their policy would have prescribed
in this situation (as determined by the conç)uter
simulation), which rule or statement of their policy would
have been used to set worker level, and the outcomes in
sugar production levels for both their policy's response
and their alternative response (if one was suggested) .
Two conditions were compared.

In one condition

(singles) participants worked alone.

These participants

formulated their own individual policy for controlling
sugar production after each of the three practice sessions.
The practice sessions were distributed over a one-week
period with one session every other day.

Participants in

the groups condition worked together in teams of four or
five individuals after each practice session to create a
group policy.

Both singles and groups used the reflective

practice procedure in which they predicted what their
previous policy would do during the second half-hour of the
second and third practice sessions

(they had no policy to

reflect on in the first practice session).
20
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The policies generated by participants in the group's
condition were superior (better at controlling sugar
production as determined by computer simulation) to those
in the singles condition.

Similarly, mean individual

performance for participants in the groups condition was
better than that in the singles condition.
Mathews et al.

(1996) used a predetermined cutoff score

to quantify the number of expert performers and policies in
each condition in the final session of practice.

Fifty-

nine percent of the participants in the groups condition
were classified as expert performers compared to 13 percent
in the singles condition.
reliable.

The difference was statistically

All of the groups achieved expert level policies

whereas none of the singles * policies achieved expert
level.
Discussion of Results of Mathews et al.

(1996)

Apparently, group interaction was essential for
obtaining the best results in terms of the most expert
level policies and for improving individual performance.
The group interaction presumably was effective because it
helped overcome rigidity in individual approaches to the
task (i.e., negative effects of mental sets, e.g., Norman,
1993; Luchins, 1942) and it exposed learners to new and
different ideas for performing the task.

However, it must

be noted that the group interaction variable was confounded
21
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with exposure to alternative models.

That is, participants

in the singles condition did not have access to any
policies other than their own.

It is possible that

exposing participants in the singles condition to the ideas
of other participants in the absence of group interaction
(e.g., give each participant a written text of other
policies) would have produced benefits as well.
The findings of Mathews et al. also suggest that
reflective practice was essential for improvement in policy
quality and task performance.

Mathews et al. argued that

reflective practice helped learners integrate new ideas
(reflective knowledge) with experiential knowledge that
drives task performance.

As suggestive as their results

are, there was no direct comparison of reflective practice
to a control condition in which no reflective practice was
done.
Therefore, one of the major goals of this investigation
was to attempt to replicate the findings of Mathews et al.
(1996) while adding an appropriate nonreflective control
condition and removing the confound of the group
interaction variable and exposure to alternative models.
That goal was addressed in Experiment 1.
The results of Experiment 1 failed to replicate the
findings of Mathews et al. (1996) .

The results suggested

that the lack of effectiveness of reflective practice might
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be related to the kinds of models learners use when
reflecting-

This was explored in Experiments 2 and 3.

As the general intent of this investigation was to
examine how learning and transfer are affected by
reflection and access to alternative ideas, the third
experiment included a trsinsfer task at the end of training.
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EXPERIMENT 1
Introduction
Experiment 1 attempted to replicate auid extend the
findings of Mathews et al.

(1996) in which a combination of

reflective practice, exposing learners to alternative
models, and group discussion led to superior performance
relative to a condition in which learners were exposed only
to their own ideas.

In particular, it investigated the

effect of reflection (i.e., writing down one's strategies
and discussing ideas with group members), exposure to
alternative models, and reflective practice on performance
in the sugar production task.
Reflection
One kind of reflection occurs in the process of writing
down one's ideas.

Requiring participants to produce

written statements of their task knowledge can be used as a
way of assuring that reflection occurs.

At the end of each

session in this experiment, participants in all but two
control conditions were required to write down a set of
instructions, a "policy", for performing the task.

Thus,

each policy was taken as evidence for reflective behavior
and was assumed to provide information about the nature of
each participant's mental model of the task.
It was predicted that this reflection would be
insufficient for improving task performance primarily
because it occurred post-task; policies were written at the
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end of each practice session.

Gagne and White (1978)

suggested that successful instruction occurs only when
prepositional (reflective) knowledge and intellectual
skills (i.e., experiential knowledge) are linked together
through reflection concurrent with practice.
Exposure to Alternative Models
Exposure to alternative models may be necessary to
counteract people's tendency to seek only information that
is consistent with their view (Wason, 1968).

To provide

the opportunity for participants to encounter alternative
task solutions and reflect about them, Mathews et al.
(1996) had their participants meet periodically in small
discussion groups.

The goal of these discussions was to

produce a written policy describing how best to achieve
target production.

Mathews et al.(1996) reported much

better performance in a condition involving group
discussion relative to a condition in which learners worked
individually.

However, it is not clear whether the

superior performance was due to the discussions or to the
exposure to others' ideas that occurred in the discussions.
Therefore, in Experiment 1 a condition was included in
which participants were given copies of others' policies
but not allowed to discuss those policies with other
participants.

This condition was called nominal groups to

indicate that they had benefit of the group's ideas without
actually meeting as a group.

The nominal groups condition
25
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was compared to a group interaction condition in which
discussion took place.

Thus, the participants in the group

interaction and nominal groups conditions were all exposed
to alternative models but group discussions took place only
in the group interaction conditions.
Exposure to alternative models was predicted to improve
the quality of individual policies.

This prediction

follows from finding that people will seek disconfirming
evidence of their hypotheses if they are made aware of the
existence of alternative hypotheses (Kareev & Avrahami,
1995).

Thus, policies should improve if invalid rules

(hypotheses) contained in them can be rejected in favor of
better rules in other's policies.

The degree to which

exposure to alternative models facilitated performance
(experiential knowledge) was expected to depend on the
presence of a third factor, reflective practice.

Only when

reflection and practice occur together is it expected that
the two sources of knowledge become integrated (Gagne &
White, 1978) .
Reflective Practice
Reflective practice was defined to be performance of
the task under conditions in which task decisions are based
on one's mental model (reflective knowledge) and one
attends to the consequences of those decisions.
Coletta et al.

Berardi-

(1995) found that requiring their

participants to "think aloud" was not effective for
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increasing transfer performance in a problem solving task.
However, when their participants were required to explain
their thinking, thereby invoking metacognitive processes
such as planning and monitoring, transfer was significantly
improved.

In Experiment 1, the effect of reflective

practice was assessed by comparing the performance of
participants who used a reflective practice procedure for
training versus participants practicing the normal sugar
production task (experiential practice).
One potential drawback of the reflective practice
procedure of Mathews et al.

(1996) was that participants

were not free to choose which policy statement to evaluate.
Instead, they attempted to predict which policy statement
would be applied by a computer simulation of their policy.
In effect, the participants in Mathews et al. were
attempting to guess what an expert, exemplified by the
program simulating their policy, would do in the current
situation if restricted to using only the participant's
policy.

Berry and Broadbent (1987) found that participant

control of the timing of explanations, as opposed to
experimenter control, was important for learning.

Also,

according to some recent theorizing in Artificial
Intelligence (AI), users of expert systems should be more
likely to accept and therefore use a system if they are
allowed to participate in the construction of explanations
of the behavior of the expert system (Ford, Canas, &
27
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Coffey, 1993).

Possibly, giving the participants control

over which policy statement to evaluate would help them
remember the status of their policy statements as they
worked.

Therefore, in the current experiment, the

reflective practice procedure of Mathews et al.

(1996) was

modified by requiring the participants to choose a policy
statement for evaluation.

Subsequently, they had to

predict the outcome of applying the policy statement.

In

order to distinguish between the procedure used by Mathews
et al.

(1996) and the modified procedure used in this

experiment, the term "assisted reflective practice" will be
used to refer to the modified procedure.
In summary, the first experiment investigated the roles
of reflection, reflective practice, and exposure to
alternative models when performing a complex control task
(e.g., the sugar production task).
made.

Three predictions were

First, improvements in ability to control sugar

production would occur only when exposure to alternative
models was accompanied by reflective practice.
the mental models of participants

Similarly,

(i.e., written policies)

were expected to be influenced only by the combination of
reflective practice and exposure to alternative models.
Third, combining reflective practice with exposure to
alternative models was expected to lead to greater
integration of reflective and experiential knowledge.
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Method
Participants and Design
One hundred fifty-three undergraduate students enrolled
in introductory psychology courses at Louisiana State
University were recruited to voluntarily participate in
return for extra-credit.
The experiment was arranged as a factorial design
comprising three factors: exposure to other's policies
(group interaction vs nominal groups vs no exposure),
practice mode (assisted reflective practice vs experiential
practice), and session.

Additionally, two control groups,

practice-only and predict-only, were included.

Neither

control condition required participants to write a policy.
The practice-only condition is a baseline against which to
compare the effect of reflective practice.
The two control conditions differed from one another
only in the practice task performed each session.

During

practice, participants in the predict-only condition were
required to predict the resulting sugar production on each
trial of practice (prediction task) .

Comparisons between

the practice-only control and the predict-only control were
used to measure the effect of unassisted reflection.
Comparisons between the practice-only control and the no
exposure/experiential condition were used to evaluate the
effect of writing a policy.
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The two primary dependent variables were performance as
indicated by the average unsigned deviation from target
production during the test phase and quality of the final
policy.

Policy quality was measured by using the policy to

simulate performance of the sugar production task.

The

average unsigned deviation from target production achieved
by the simulated policy was taken to be the policy quality.
The simulation procedure is described in Appendix A.
Procedure
Participants were tested in groups ranging from three
to six individuals.

Each group was randomly assigned to

one of the eight conditions.

Regardless of condition, all

participants completed three sessions, one per day.

For

all participants, the three sessions were completed within
seven days.

Figure 1 depicts the sequence of tasks

performed in each session by the participants.

As shown in

Figure 1, participants performed three basic tasks each
session:
policies.

(1) practice;

(2) test; and (3) writing individual

Additionally, participants in the nominal groups

and group interaction conditions began the second and third
sessions by forming a group policy.
First session.

In the first session, all participants

were told that they were to take on the role of manager of
a simulated sugar production factory.

They were informed

that their job was to learn how to achieve and maintain a
target level of sugar production by interacting with the
30
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Begin

Practice

T est
Construct
group
policy
W rite
Individual
Policy

Last
Session
No
Yes
End

Figure 1. General sequence of tasks performed by
participants each session in Experiment 1. Participants
in the no exposure conditions did not construct group
policies.
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simulation.

They were further informed that the only

variable they could control was the size of workforce used
at the simulated sugar production factory.

Thus, their

task was to l e a m the relationship between workforce size
and production level.

Participants were also told that

they would have additional tasks but would be given
instructions at the appropriate time.
After receiving instructions, participants were given
30 minutes to practice or interact with the simulation
program.

In all conditions but predict-only the simulation

program was the standard sugar production task.

In the

predict-only condition, the prediction task replaced the
sugar production task as the practice task.

The sugar

production task and prediction task are described below.
After practicing for 30 minutes, all participants
performed the test.

The test comprised four blocks of 10

trials of the sugar production task.

The participants were

allowed up to 30 minutes to complete the test.

The

participants were informed that their goal was to stay as
close as possible to the target production level.
After completing the test, each participants, except
those in the two control conditions, were given 15 minutes
to write down his or her policy for controlling sugar
production.

This completed the first session.

Second and third session.

In all conditions but the

two control conditions, participants were returned their
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written policies from the previous session.
were inscribed with a rating.

The policies

Participants were told that

the rating indicated how well another manager was aÜDle to
perform the sugar production task when using their written
policy as a guide.

The rating procedure is described below

under the heading of policy feedback.
After receiving an explanation of the ratings,
participants in the nominal groups and group interaction
conditions were given 15 minutes to form a group policy
before proceeding to the practice-test-write policy
sequence followed in the first session.

The group policy

formation procedure is described below.

Participants in

the no exposure conditions did not construct group
policies.
The same practice-test-write policy sequence used in
the first session was followed for the second and third
sessions.

However, before beginning to practice, all

participants

(except controls) were told that they would

have to write a new policy at the end of the session and
therefore should be thinking about how to improve their
policy as they practiced.
To investigate the effect of reflective practice, the
practice task was changed as follows for the second and
third sessions.

Participants in reflective practice

conditions (except for controls) performed the assisted
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reflective procedure instead of the sugar production task
during the practice portion of the session.
The test portion of the second and third sessions was
the same 40 trial sequence as in the first session.
However, this time, participants were allowed to refer to
their written policies from the previous session as they
performed the test.
At the end of the session, participants were instructed
to write new policies based on the performance of their old
policies.

They were informed that they could include any

or all of their old policies in the new ones.

After the

end of the third session, all participants were debriefed
and given a slip for their extra credit points.
Tasks
Sugar production task.

Experiment 1 used the sugar

production task used by Berry and Broadbent (1984) and as
described in the discussion of Mathews et al.

(1996).

This

is a computer-based task in which participants imagine they
are in charge of a factory that produces sugar.

The

participants attempted to achieve and maintain a specified
level of an output variable, sugar production, by
controlling the number of workers employed by a simulated
sugar-production factory.

On each task trial, the computer

presented to the participant a current level of sugar
production.

The participant responded by choosing and

entering the number of workers to be employed.

The
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computer then updated and displayed the new sugar
production level.
Task trials were grouped into blocks of ten trials and
each block began with a randomly selected production level.
Figure 2 shows the graphical display seen by participants.
Sugar production level is represented on the vertical axis
of the graph.

The dashed horizontal line shows the target

production level.
sequence of trials.

The horizontal axis represents the
The number of workers entered on each

trial is displayed on the horizontal axis.

Each sugar

production output is represented by an 'X* on the graph.
At the end of each block, the display was cleared and a new
graph displayed for the next block of trials.
Sugar production was allowed to vary from 1000 tons to
12000 tons.

Participants were allowed to select a number

of workers ranging from 100 to 1200 in multiples of 50.
The target production was fixed at 6000 tons.
The relationship between number of workers and sugar
production was identical to that used by Mathews et al.
(1996) . The main dependent measure was the mean unsigned
deviation from target production, in tons, across a block
of ten trials.

Because the target production level was

always 6000 tons, the dependent measure could vary from a
minimum of zero, if on target for every trial, to a maximum
of 6000.

Chance performance was defined as the mean

unsigned deviation that would be achieved by entering a
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12000
11000

10000
9000
8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000

2000
1000

Workers:

400

250

300

300

Current production level is 2000 tons.
Current workforce size is 300 workers.
Enter number of workers = » _

Figure 2 . Graphical display seen by a participant
performing the sugar production task. The target
production is represented by the dashed horizontal line and
the production level achieved on each trial is indicated by
an ’X' . Number of workers used on each trial is recorded
below the horizontal axis.
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random value for workers on every trial.

Chance

performance was thus determined to be 4206 tons.
In order to minimize variability in the dependent
measure, the effect of the random element was removed from
the deviation score before submitting the data for
analysis.

The random element was removed by recomputing

the production level that would have been achieved on each
trial without the random element in the equation.
Assisted reflective practice.

The assisted reflective

practice procedure required participants to explicitly
state which particular statement of their written policy
(their reflective knowledge of the task) they were
following when they made their decisions about the number
of workers to use.

On each trial, the computer prompted

them to enter an identifier (statement number) for the
statement or rule they thought best applied in the current
situation.

They were also prompted to enter the number of

workers to be used according to the rule, and the
production level they expected to achieve.

After entering

this information, the computer calculated and displayed the
new production level.

At this time, the participant was

given the opportunity to repeat the trial by entering a
different number of workers.
Prediction Task.

Participants in the predict-only

control condition performed a modified version of the sugar
production task during their practice sessions.
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On each

trial of the prediction task, after entering a worker
level, they were prompted by the computer to predict what
the resulting production would be.

After entering their

prediction, the computer calculated and displayed the new
production level.
Policy feedback.

During the one-day interval between

sessions, the written policies were assigned a rating
indicating their quality.

At the beginning of all but the

first session, the rated policies were returned to the
participants in order to give them feedback about the
validity of their reflective knowledge.
The ratings were determined by using them to perform
the sugar production task for 20 trials.

On each trial, a

rater selected the most appropriate rule from the policy
and entered the indicated number of workers.

The most

appropriate rule was considered to be the one that matched
the current situation and was the most specific in its
range of application.
following rules:

Consider, for example, the two

(1) "if you are above the target

production of 6000 then you should decrease the size of the
workforce"; and (2) "if current production level is between
8000 and 10000 tons then you should use 800 workers."

Both

rules would be applicable to any trial on which current
production level is 9000 tons.

However, the second rule is

more specific (i.e., applicable in fewer situations) and
would be chosen by the rater.

On trials where no rule
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applied, the rater entered the same number of workers used
on the previous trial, unless it was the first trial.

In

this situation the rater entered a randomly selected number
of workers.

On trials where the policy indicated only a

range of workers (e.g., more workers, or a high number of
workers) the following actions were taken:

(a) "more, or

less, workers than X" was interpreted as a randomly
selected value of workers between X and the maximum or
minimum number of workers allowed, respectively;
high, or

(b) "a

low, number of workers" was taken to mean a

randomly selected number of workers above 750 or below 450
respectively; and (c) "an increasing, or decreasing, number
of workers" was interpreted the same as in (a).

A random

number generator (computer program) assisted the rater in
selecting random values.
Each policy was assigned a rating indicating its
quality according to the average unsigned deviation from
target.

The policy ratings, described below, were

inscribed on the policies.

Policies were rated as follows:

EXPERT - deviation less than 1000 tons, GOOD - deviation
greater than or equal to 1000 tons and less than 2500 tons,
SATISFACTORY - deviation greater than or equal to 2500 tons
and less than 4000 tons, and UNSATISFACTORY - deviation
greater than or equal to 4000 tons.
Forming group policies.

At the beginning of the second

and third sessions, and after receiving copies of their
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rated policies written at the end of the previous session
(see Figure 1) , participants in the group interaction
conditions met for 20 minutes in order to form a group
policy.

Interactions of the groups were unstructured, that

is, members were free to organize the process in any way
they chose.

The experimenter instructed them to combine

their individual policies into a single written policy.
After completing this process, the experimenter made copies
of the group policy and distributed one to each group
member to use during the subsequent practice and test
procedures.
Participants in the nominal groups conditions did not
discuss their policies.

Instead, they received copies of

the individual policies of the other members of their group
and were instructed to form a single written policy based
on those policies.

They were instructed to use any rules

from their own or others' policies that they wished.
Results and Discussion
The Effect of Assisted Reflective Practice on Reflective
Knowledge
The final policies for all participants were evaluated
by a computer simulation as described in Appendix A.

The

mean simulated performance of the final session policies is
displayed in Table 1.

Data from the two control conditions

were not included in the analysis of reflective knowledge
because participants did not write policies.
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Tahl P 1 - Mean absolute deviation from target by condition
cind session in Experiment 1.

Session
Final
Policy

Condition
no exposure
experiential

28.0

21.7

16.9

27.2

.47*

reflective

26.2

26.2

23.9

27.6

,56*

experiential

27.9

20.8

19.7

23.1

,60*

reflective

28.4

25.1

21.3

25.9

02

experiential

26.4

20.7

13.0

15.8

62*

reflective

28.0

28.1

25.6

31.0

49*

practice-only

27.4

21.6

19.9

predict-only

31.9

27.9

28.0

nominal groups

group interaction

controls

Note. Means are expressed in hundreds of tons. For
example, a mean of 28.0 means an average deviation of 2800
tons off target.
The rightmost column shows correlations
between final policy quality and final performance.
* indicates p < .05.
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It was predicted that a combination of assisted
reflective practice and exposure to alternative models was
necessary for changing peoples’ mental models of the task
(as reflected in their written policies).

That is, an

interaction between exposure to other's policies and
practice mode was expected.

Although the interaction

between practice mode and exposure to other's policies was
significant, F(2,109) = 5.76, MSE = 106.1, p = .004, its
direction was not as expected-

The overall effect of

assisted reflective practice was negative, F(l,109) =
10.06, MSE = 106.1, p = .002.

Test of simple main effects

revealed that the effect of practice mode was only present
for the group interaction condition where the exposure to
alternative models was present and reinforced through group
discussion, F(l,109) = 21.07, MSE = 106.1, p < .01.
Contrary to these results, Mathews et al.

(1996)

reported that reflective practice led to large improvements
in policy quality for participants in their groups
condition.

A way to reconcile this difference in results

is to examine the information available to the participants
during reflective practice.
In Mathews et al.

(1996), feedback to participants

about policy quality was generated by simulating the
policies with a computer program.

To prepare them for

simulation, the policies were first translated into sets of
condition-action rules (e.g., if production is high, use
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fewer workers) .

Policy statements that were ambiguous were

not included in the simulation.

The simulation program was

a variant of a classifier system (Holland et al., 1986;
Druhan & Mathews, 1989; Roussel & Mathews, 1990), which is
a production system in which rules compete against each
other based on strength (past success rate for each rule),
specificity (number of conditions specified), and support
(agreement in action with other rules) to control the
system's response.

In this way, the simulation not only

evaluates the policy by using it to control sugar
production, but it also adjusts the strength of the rules
to optimize success with a given set of rules

(Mathews et

al., 1996).
The feedback received by the participants in Mathews et
al.

(1996) was a score indicating the success of the

optimized policy controlling sugar production.
Additionally, any rules whose final strength at the end of
the simulation was below a threshold value (indicating they
never succeeded in the rule competition process in the
simulation) were indicated as such by a note written
directly on the policy.

Thus participants received

information about which rules were ineffective.

This

allowed learners to focus only on the most valid rules.

By

contrast, in the current experiment, participants were
given only a global policy score indicating the quality of
the policy as a whole.
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In addition to informing them about the relative
effectiveness of each of their rules, the reflective
practice procedure of Mathews et al.

(1996) directed the

participants' attention toward the best rule on each trial.
On each trial the participants were required to predict how
many workers their policy would use and which particular
rule would be employed (by the simulation program) to set
the size of the workforce.

Following their responses, they

received feedback on what workforce size their policy would
have set in this situation and which rule was used.
As a result of these differences between the reflective
practice procedures of Mathews et al.

(1996) and the

current experiments, participants in the experiment of
Mathews et al. probably gained more experience with more
valid rules and less experience with invalid rules.
Further, the more extensive feedback concerning the
relative effectiveness of individual rules given by Mathews
et al.

(1996) may have helped their participants to improve

their reflective knowledge by eliminating ineffective
rules.
A qualitative look at policies in the group interaction
conditions in the current experiment showed that reflective
knowledge was drastically different across reflective and
experiential conditions. The policies of participants
performing experiential practice consisted largely of
statements of specific situations (e.g., when production is
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3000 tons, use 500 workers) whereas policies of
participants performing reflective practice rarely
contained specific situations.

The mean number of specific

situations mentioned in the experiential and reflective
conditions were 7.21 (S2 = 5.26) and .95 (SD = 2.67),
respectively.

Typical policy statements in the reflective

practice condition were elaborations of the (invalid)
belief that more workers produce more sugar (e.g., if
production is below target, then add 50 to 100 workers).
Almost as frequent were references to patterns of sugar
output across several consecutive trials and the
corresponding response.

For example, "if production

changed from high to low, then production level will
probably increase this trial, therefore use less workers to
compensate for the expected increase."
These differences in participants' conceptions of the
sugar production task show that assisted reflective
practice did have a powerful influence on reflective
knowledge, even if that influence was negative.

Although

it was contrary to the predicted effect, it is consistent
with findings of implicit learning studies in which rule
search fails (e.g., Reber 1976; Reber et al., 1980).

These

results, along with the interpretation of the differences
between the reflective practice task of Mathews et al. and
assisted reflective practice also suggest that presenting
learners with a few valid and specific situations might be
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beneficial.

This possibility is taken up in subsequent

experiments.
The Effect of Reflective Practice on Task Performance
It is assumed that experiential knowledge is best
measured by the ability to control sugar production.

Thus,

task performance during each test session is taken to be an
index of experiential knowledge.

Table 1 displays the mean

performance in each condition across the three test
sessions.
Performance means were analyzed within a repeated
measures ANOVA.

The three factors included in the ANOYA

were session, practice mode, and exposure to other's
policies.

Session was the repeated factor.

The two

control conditions, practice-only and predict-only were
excluded from this analysis and are addressed later.
Performance improved across sessions, F (2,218) = 37.44,
MSE = 41.6,

p < .0001, indicating that participants were

gaining experiential knowledge.

Participants in

experiential conditions consistently outperformed their
reflective counterparts, F(l,109) = 10.90, MSE = 137.8, p <
.001, contrary to the expected benefit of reflective
practice. The interaction between practice mode and session
was also statistically significant, F(2,218) = 8.98, MSE =
41.6, p < .0001.

The pattern of means suggested that the

negative effect of reflective practice increased across
trials.

To interpret this interaction, tests of simple
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main effects were performed to compare reflective against
experiential at each level of session.

The error term for

these tests was formed by pooling the between-subjects and
within-subjects error terms (see, Kirk, 1982, for an
explanation of the procedure) and the significance level
(alpha) was adjusted using Bonferroni's procedure.

The

practice mode effect was not present at session 1, F(l,327)
= .005, MSE = 73.65.

This was expected because

participants in the reflective and experiential conditions
were treated identically at the first session.

The effect

of practice mode was statistically significant at sessions
2 and 3, F(l,327) = 11.36, MSE = 73.65, p < .01, and
F(l,435) = 19.74, MSE = 73.65, p < .01, respectively.
The next analysis of performance focused on the final
session where one would expect any treatment effects to be
the greatest.

Data from sessions 1 and 2 were excluded

from this analysis.

These results also can be directly

compared to the findings for reflective knowledge discussed
above.
Participants in the experiential conditions
outperformed participants in the reflective conditions,
F (1,109) = 16.05, MSE = 87.9, p = .0001.

There was no main

effect of exposure to other's policies, F(2,109) = .19,
MSE = 87.9, p > .05, but the interaction between practice
mode and exposure to other's policies was significant,
F(2,109) = 3.20, MSE = 87.9, p = .045.

Tests of simple
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main effects showed that the practice mode effect was
marginal for the no exposure condition, F(l,109) = 5.58,
MSE =87.9,

p = .03, nonsignificant for nominal groups,

cuid significant for the group interaction condition
F (1,109) = 17.3, MSE =87.9,

p < .01.

Inspection of the

means shows the effect of practice mode largest in the
group interaction condition (M = 13.04 vs M = 25.57 for
experiential and reflective conditions, respectively) .
Other than the marginal effect of reflective practice
for the no exposure condition, the results for experiential
knowledge were the same as those for reflective knowledge.
Thus, the same positive effects of group discussion and
experiential practice were found for reflective knowledge
and experiential knowledge.
The final analysis of experiential knowledge
investigated differences between the two control conditions
and the no exposure/experiential condition.

Recall that

participants in the practice-only control condition were
treated the same as those in the no exposure/experiential
condition, except that the practice-only controls did not
write a policy at the end of each session.

Thus, a

comparison between these two conditions will reveal any
effect of post-task reflection in the form of writing a
policy.

Participants in the predict-only control condition

also did not write a policy.

However, the prediction task

can be considered as an unassisted reflective practice
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task.

Thus, the comparison between the two control

conditions will allow an assessment of the effect of
unaided reflection.
The three conditions differed in final session
performance, F(2,57) = 6.04, MSE = 105.0, p = .004.
Tukey/Kramer pairwise comparisons revealed that policy
writing had no effect on performance; the difference
between practice-only and no exposure/experiential was not
significant, Q(57) = 1.35, p > .05.

However, the

requirement to predict sugar production on each trial
significantly hurt performance relative to the practiceonly controls, û(57) = 3.42, p < .05.

Thus, unaided

reflection actually hurt performance.
It is possible that the consistent negative effect of
reflection across all conditions arose out of differences
in the number of practice trials experienced by the
experiential and reflective learners.

Because reflective

practice requires slow and deliberate responding, learners
in reflective conditions might simply have experienced
fewer practice trials.

An examination of data from

practice sessions showed that experiential and reflective
learners completed an average of 1092.8
440.9 (SD = 237.9) trials, respectively.

= 413.0) and
A correlation

analysis was performed to ascertain the contribution of
accumulated practice to performance on the final test.
results showed that the number of practice trials was
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The

significam.tly correlated with test performance/ r = -.283,
p < .05.

However, the number of practice trials is

confounded with practice mode.

Therefore, a semi-partial

correlation coefficient was computed in which the
correlation between test performance euid practice mode was
removed from the correlation between test performance and
number of practice trials.

The resulting semi-partial

correlation coefficient was essentially 0, r = -.022,
E > .05.

Therefore, the poor performance of reflective

learners does not appear to be due to completion of fewer
practice trials.
The Effect of Providing Alternative Models
As already noted, there were no main effects of
exposure on either experiential or reflective knowledge.
The provision of alternative models did interact with mode
of practice.

However, tests of simple main effects

(reported above) showed that the interaction was explained
by a large practice mode effect in the group interaction
condition.

The provision of alternative models alone

(i.e., in the absence of group interaction) had no effect
on performance.
The Effect of Group Discussion
As just discussed, the interaction between exposure to
alternative models and practice mode was accounted for by
the practice mode effect in the group interaction
condition.

Thus, group interaction did have some effect
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beyond that of exposure to alternative models.

Recall also

that the final policies of experiential and reflective
learners in the group interaction condition were
distinguished by a difference in the number of specific
situations mentioned.

Relative to the policies of

reflective learners, the final policies of experiential
learners tended to contain more statements referring to
specific situations.

This finding suggests that group

discussion (post-task reflection) played some role in the
development of learners' mental models.

To examine this

role, a simple qualitative analysis of policies was carried
out.
To get a clear picture of the effect of group
discussion, a comparison was made between the policies of
the group interaction condition and the nominal groups
condition.

These conditions differed only by the presence

or absence of group interaction.

The policies chosen for

examination were the group policies written at the
beginning of the second practice session.

Up until the

time these policies were written, participants in the two
conditions had been treated identically except for the
group policy formation task (See Figure 1).

Recall that

each participant in the nominal groups condition formed his
or her own group policy after being given copies of the
policies of the other group members.

By contrast, the

participants in the group interaction condition met as a
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group to construct a single group policy.

Because at this

stage of the experiment experiential and reflective
learners had been treated identically, the data from these
two conditions were pooled for this analysis.
The number of specific situations mentioned for the
nominal groups and group interaction conditions were
tallied as before.

To determine if the groups differed in

their tendency to generate specific statements, each policy
was categorized as follows: A general policy, if no
specific situations were mentioned, or a specific policy,
if one or more specific situations were mentioned.

One-

third of the policies in the nominal groups condition were
categorized as specific policies compared to two-thirds of
the policies of the group interaction condition.
difference was marginally significant, ^

This

= 3.334, p =

.072.
Although not strong, this evidence suggests that post
task reflection might play a role in the interaction
between practice mode and exposure to alternative models.
Possibly, group discussions lead to more specific and
better quality policies but reflective practice can subvert
the process.

Conversely, experiential practice may

interact positively with the more specific policies to lead
to good performance.
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Integration of Reflective and Experiential Knowledge
As a way of assessing integration between reflective
and experiential knowledge eind as check on the validity of
the procedure for measuring policy quality, correlations
between policy quality and performance were computed.
Large correlations cannot prove that there was integration
(agreement) between experiential and reflective knowledge
nor can it prove that the measurement of policy quality was
valid.

However, very small correlations would indicate

either lack of integration or lack of validity.

The

correlations are displayed in the rightmost column of Table
1.

Correlations were large and statistically significant
for all except the nominal groups/reflective condition.

A

scatter-plot for the nominal groups/reflective condition
was examined to check for any spurious data that might
explain the lack of correlation.

That check revealed that

the small correlation was not accounted for by any spurious
data points.
These correlation results suggest that learners were
able to integrate their experiential and reflective
knowledge of the task.

However, this may sometimes hurt

rather than help performance (e.g., in the group
interact ion/reflective practice condition) .

The one

nonsignificant correlation in the nominal groups/reflective
practice condition indicates that learners in this
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condition were unable to make sense of the wealth of
information they were provided with.
The results of experiment 1 suggested that the
specificity of learners' mental models was related to their
ability to control sugar production; the policies of
participants in the best performing condition
(experiential/group interaction) tended contain many
statements of specific situations.

Further, reflective

practice led learners to generate very general rules of low
validity.

Experiment 2 examined this relationship by

providing some learners with hints consisting of specific
or concrete situations illustrating how to control sugar
production.

The question addressed was whether providing

these hints would prevent reflective practice from causing
learners to generate overly general policies.
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EXPERIMENT 2
Introduction.
One possible explanation for the negative effect of
assisted reflective practice in Experiment 1 is a tendency
to seek or create only general rules, which are not very
useful in performing the task.
reflective abstraction error.

I refer to this tendency as
Perhaps participants in the

high performing group interaction/experiential practice
condition avoided the error by not reflecting while
performing the task.

Consequently, the group discussion

was focused more on concrete experiences or cases in which
they successfully controlled sugar production rather than
abstract rules about the relations between workers and
production.
Experiment 2 attempted to inhibit participants'
tendency to create overly general rules (i.e., reflective
abstraction error) by giving them a hint describing
concrete or specific situations.

The hint comprised valid

work force levels for four specific situations.

It was

presented to some participants at the beginning of the
second and third practice sessions.

It was predicted that

the hint would induce learners to switch to a strategy of
encoding the task as specific condition-action rules in a
manner similar to participants in the group
interaction/experiential condition of Experiment 1.

The

consequence of encoding the task as specific situations
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would be to reduce the chance for reflective abstraction
error and thus lead to a corresponding improvement in
performance.
The hints can be construed also as a variation of the
procedure in Experiment 1 for providing learners with an
alternative model of the task.

The difference is that the

hints are provided by the experimenter and are valid.

By

contrast, the alternative models of Experiment 1 were
provided by other participants and were likely to be
invalid.

Thus, Experiment 2 provides a more powerful test

of the effect of exposing participants alternative models
of the task.
Method
Participants and Design
Fifty-two undergraduate students enrolled in
introductory psychology courses at Louisiana State
University were recruited to voluntarily participate in
return for extra-credit.
Three experimental conditions were examined: hint/
experiential practice, hint/assisted reflective practice,
and a no hint/experiential practice control condition.

As

in the previous experiment, session was a within-subjects
factor.
The primary dependent variable was performance as
indicated by the average unsigned deviation from target
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production.

An additional dependent measure, policy

quality, was assessed as it was in Experiment 1.
Procedure
Participants were tested in groups of three to six
individuals.

Each group was randomly assigned to one of

the three conditions.

Regardless of condition, all

participants completed three sessions, one per day.

For

all participants, the three sessions were completed within
seven days.

The procedure was identical to that followed

in Experiment 1 for the no exposure conditions except for
the provision of the hints described below.

That is, all

participants were exposed only to their own policies or to
an experimenter-provided hint.

Participants did not

discuss their polices with others in any conditions .
Participants in the hint conditions received a hint in
the form of a typed text at the beginning of the second and
third sessions.

They were told that the hint would help

them learn to control sugar production.

The hint was taken

away at the beginning of the test phase for each session.
The hint was as follows:
The number of workers should always follow the level of
production. That is, when production is high, you need
a lot of workers and when production is low, you need
few workers. Similarly, when production is near the
middle, you should use a moderate level of workers, not
high and not low. Below are four specific examples.
If
If
If
If

production
production
production
production

is 1000 tons,
is 4000 tons,
is 7000 tons,
is 10000 tons,

then use
then use
then use
then use

350 workers.
500 workers.
650 workers.
800 workers.
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Results and Discussion
The Effect of the Hint on Strategy
The number of specific situations mentioned in each
participant's policy was tallied.

A median test for

independent groups (Siegel & Castellan, 1988) revealed that
there were differences across conditions in the number of
specific situations mentioned,

(2) = 17.79, p < .05.

The

mean number of specific situations mentioned was 1.96,
5.82, and 3.95, for the control, hint/experiential, and
hint/reflective conditions, respectively.

The two hint

conditions did not differ from each other,

= .017, p

> .05, but both differed from the control condition, X"(D
= 12.78, B < .05.
The Effect of the Hint on Reflective Knowledge
Although provision of the hint did cause participants
to mention more specific situations in their policies, this
does not guarantee that the resulting policies were more
valid.

To answer that question, the final policies for all

participants were simulated as in Experiment 1.

The mean

performances for the simulated final policies are displayed
in Table 2.
The performance of the simulated policies differed
across the three conditions, F (2,49) = 10.37, MSE = 145.8,
p = .0002.

However, only the hint/experiential condition

was better than controls, û(49) = 6.34, p < .05.

The

hint/reflective condition did not differ from the control
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Table 2 . Mean absolute deviation from target by condition
and session in Experiment 2.

Session
1

2

3

Final
Policy

r

no hint/experiential

30.0

26.2

21.5

29.55

.24

hint/experiential

28.6

9.4

6.9

10.68

.60*

hint/reflective

29.9

14.7

10.7

24.54

.31

Condition

Note. Means are expressed in hundreds of tons. For
example, a mean of 28.0 means an average deviation of 2800
tons off target. The rightmost column shows correlations
between final policy quality and final performance.
* indicates p < .05.
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condition, ^(49) = 1.81, g > .05.

Thus, assisted

reflective practice had the same destructive effect on
reflective knowledge as it did in Experiment 1.
The Effect of the Hint on Task Performance
The three conditions differed overall, F(2,49) = 8.91,
MSE = 182.2, p = .0005 and performance improved across
sessions, F(2,98) = 93.34, MSE = 40.6, p < .0001.

The

interaction between condition and session was also
statistically significant, F(4,218) = 8.98, MSE = 40.6, p <
.001.

Tests of simple main effects showed that condition

was not significant at the first session.

This was

expected because participants in all conditions were
treated the same.

However, performance differed across

treatments for the second, F (2,147) = 14.68, MSE = 87.8, p
< .01, and third

session, F(2,147) = 11.50, MSE = 87.8, p

< .01 .
Participants in both hint conditions performed better
than controls during the final session.

The difference

between the hint/experiential and hint/reflective
conditions was not significant, û(49) = 1.612, p < .05.
Recall that in Experiment 1 reflective practice reduced
both the final level of task performance and the final
policy quality, relative to experiential practice.
Providing the hint in Experiment 2 overcame the negative
impact of reflective practice on task performance but not
on final policy quality.

This result suggests an increased
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dissociation between experiential and reflective knowledge
under conditions of reflective practice.
Further evidence of this dissociation is the lack of a
significant correlation between final policy quality
(reflective knowledge) and final test performêince
(experiential knowledge).

Reflective and experiential

knowledge were

correlated in the experiential/hint

condition, r =

.60, p < .05, but not in the reflective/hint

condition, r =

.31, p > .05. The lack of a significant

correlation in

the nohint control condition is puzzling in

that this condition was identical to the no
exposure/experiential condition of experiment 1 where a
significant correlation was found.

There is no explanation

of this inconsistency between experiment 1 and experiment
2.
The next experiment explored this dissociation.
Specifically, the reflective practice procedure was
modified in an attempt to overcome the dissociation between
experiential and reflective knowledge.

Additionally, the

next experiment incorporated a transfer task in order to
investigate the flexibility of Icnowledge in the sugar
production task.
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EXPERIMENT 3
Introduction
In Experiment 2, the hint improved performance but did
not improve policy quality when learners practiced
reflectively, suggesting an increased dissociation between
reflective and experiential knowledge.

In response to that

finding, the reflective practice procedure of Experiments 1
and 2 was replaced by a simpler method for fostering
reflective practice.

In Experiment 3, participants in the

reflective practice conditions were provided with paper and
pencil during performance of the task and encouraged to
record their behavior aind its results while performing the
task.

They were advised to use their notes to help them

with their decisions about workforce size.

The use of

cognitive artifacts like pencil and paper is characteristic
of reflective thought (Norman, 1993).
It was expected that the use of pencil and paper would
cause participants to "stop and think" as they worked
(Gagne & Smith, 1962).

Further, it would serve as external

memory and thus lessen the demand for cognitive resources
as they worked.

Participants in the experiential

conditions were not allowed to use pencil and paper thereby
removing support for reflective thought.

It was assumed

that removing this support would lead to a default to
experiential processing.
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Experiment 3 also addressed the issue of flexibility of
knowledge.

Some researchers have suggested that implicitly

(experientially) acquired knowledge is inflexible-

For

example, Dienes and Fahey (1995) found that performance was
at chance levels for situations which had not been
experienced previously.

That is, transfer of knowledge was

highly specific (Berry & Dienes, 1993).
In Experiment 3, a transfer task was used to
investigate flexibility of knowledge.

During the final

test phase, participants were asked to achieve a new
(novel) target production on half of the trials.

If

experiential knowledge is as specific as claimed then
performance on new targets should be near chance.
Because the hint had such a powerful effect on
performance in Experiment 2, it was included here to
investigate its effect on transfer.

Two levels of hint

were examined, a general hint that mentioned only relative
values for workers and production, and a specific hint that
gave four specific situations in addition to the general
hint for controlling sugar production.

It was expected

that the general hint would show the most transfer to the
new target level.

The specific hint applied only to the

old target level and thus it was not clear what effect it
would

have on performance during transfer.
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Method
Participants and Design
One hundred twenty-one undergraduate students enrolled
in introductory psychology courses at Louisiana State
University were recruited to voluntarily participate in
return for extra-credit.

As before, all participants were

tested in groups of three to six individuals.
Three independent variables were arranged in a
factorial design: practice mode (reflective vs
experiential), hint (none vs general vs specific), and
target level (old vs new) .

The no hint/experiential

condition was considered to be a control condition.
level was a within-subjects factor.

Target

The repeated factor of

session was also included as in the previous two
experiments.
Procedure
Each group of three to six individuals was randomly
assigned to one of the six conditions.

The general

procedure was identical to that followed in Experiment 2 in
that each session consisted of a practice phase and a test
phase.

However, the original, or old, target level was

exchanged for a new target level for half of the trials
during the test phase of the third session.
Two target levels were used: 4000 and 8000.

Each

individual was randomly assigned to one of the target
levels for the first two sessions.

This was considered the
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"old" target level.

Midway through the test phase of the

final session, the target level was switched to the other
target for the remaining trials.

Participants were warned

about the change and were told to do their best at
achieving the new target level.

Thus, each participant

performed twenty trials with each target level.
During the test phase of each session, participants in
the reflective conditions could use any notes they had made
during the practice phase.

Thus, any superiority of the

reflective conditions could be due to having this aid
during the test and not due to reflection during practice.
To control for this advantage, an extra test phase was
included at the end of the experiment.

At the end of the

third session, and after all participants had written their
final policy, all notes and policies were taken from the
participants and they completed twenty more test trials.
During this test, the same two target levels were used as
before.

The old target level was used for the first ten

trials and the previously new target level for the final
ten trials.
Results and Discussion
The Effect of Reflection (Paper and Pencil)
Mean test performance across sessions (collapsed over
old and new target levels) is displayed in Table 3.

There

were no differences between the experiential and reflective
conditions, F(l,115) = .25, MSE = 139.9, p = .62, nor was
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Tahlf» 3 - Mean absolute deviation from target by condition
and session, collapsed over target level for Experiment 3.

Session
Final
Policy

Condition
no hint
experiential

23.7

20.1

21.6

35.5

,14

reflective

25.2

22.3

20.6

33.0

05

experiential

25.6

14.0

16.0

31.3

06

reflective

24.6

12.6

15.8

36.0

04

experiential

20.3

11.7

15.4

31.8

18

reflective

24.9

12.3

15.6

32.7

01

general hint

specific hint

Note. Means are expressed in hundreds of tons. For
example, a mean of 28.0 means an average deviation of 2800
tons off target.
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the interaction between practice mode and hint significant,
F(2,115) = .41, MSB = 139.9, p = .67.

It is quite

surprising that being allowed to record one's interactions
with the task had no effect on performance.

One would

expect that, at least on occasion during the test, a
participant would encounter a situation similar to one
experienced during practice and could therefore benefit
from a written record of that experience.
this did not happen.

But, obviously,

Indeed, the same analysis performed

on the simulated final policy performance (Table 3)
revealed no main effects or interactions for practice mode
or hint (all Fs < 1).

It seems the ability to keep a

written record did not influence policies either.
Although reflection had no effect on either policy
quality or performance, it might have influenced the
dissociation between experiential and reflective knowledge
found in the previous experiment.

The correlations between

experiential and reflective knowledge (Table 3) are all
small and not significantly different from zero.

This

would seem to suggest that there was a strong dissociation
present across all conditions.

However, the design of the

transfer task allowed participants' policies to be
ambiguous with respect to the target level to which they
applied.

Recall that the final polices were written after

the final test.

In the final test, target levels were

changed in order to investigate transfer.

Subsequently,
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when participants wrote their final policies, most did not
state whether their policies applied to old or new targets,
or both.

Neither did they ask the experimenter whether

they should specify target levels in their policies.

Thus,

the low correlations are not necessarily indicative of a
dissociation.
The Effect of Hints on Task Performance
The effect of hint type was significant, F{2,115) =
7.13, MSE = 139.9, p = .0012, and interacted with the
session variable, F (4,230) = 5.73, MSE = 39.6, p = .0002.
The effect of hint was not present at session 1 (F<1), but
was significant for session 2, F (2,345) = 13.67, MSE =
73.0, p < .01, and for session 3, F(2,345) =5.27, MSE =
73.0, p < .01.
controls

Both hint conditions were superior to

(no hint) at session 3 but did not differ from

each other.
An effect of hint type on experiential knowledge
(performance) without a corresponding effect on policy
quality is consistent with the differential impact of hint
in the hint/reflective condition of experiment 2.

This

demonstrates that learners draw upon distinct knowledge for
performing and for communicating (i.e., writing policies).
Flexibility of Knowledge
Because practice mode had no effect on performance,
data from experiential and reflective conditions were
combined for the remaining analyses.
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Flexibility was assessed by measuring performance
separately for old and new target levels.

Mean

performances for old and new targets are presented in Table
4 under the heading "first transfer test."

Additionally,

the difference between performance on old and new targets
is also displayed.

Data from the first transfer test are

considered first.
Performance was better for old targets than for new,
F(l,118) = 91.88, MSE = 605.3, p = .0001.

Looked at this

way, there was negative transfer to new targets.

However,

performance on old targets is not the proper baseline for
measuring transfer.

One way to measure transfer is to

compare performance on new targets relative to chance
performance.
To ascertain whether performance on new targets was
better than chance, 99 percent confidence intervals were
constructed around performance means for new targets in
each condition.

These confidence intervals were inspected

to see if they contained 42, which is chance performance.
The upper bounds for all three confidence intervals were
below 30 (hundred tons) which is well below 42, the
deviation score achieved by random selection of worker
levels.

This indicates that performance on new targets was

better than chance.
Hint level also interacted with target level, F(2,118)
= 4.58, MSE = 605.3, p = .012.

To interpret the
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Table 4 . Mean absolute deviation from target by type of
hint and target before and after retention interval.

first transfer test
hint

old

new

none

17.5

general
specific

second transfer test

old-new

old

new

old-new

24.7

-7.2

16.6

25.2

-8.6

12.0

19.7

-7.7

13.0

20.2

-7.2

8.6

22.4

-13.8

9.8

18.2

-8.4

Note. Means are expressed in hundreds of tons. For
example, a mean of 28.0 means an average deviation of 2800
tons off target. The values in the columns labeled "oldnew" indicate the difference in performance on old and new
targets.
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interaction, Tukey/Kramer pairwise comparisons were made
separately for old and new targets.

The performance means

on old targets were 17.5, 12.0, and 8.6, for the no hint,
general hint, and specific hint condition, respectively.
Both hint conditions were better than the no hint
condition.

Although the mean for the specific hint

condition was lower than the mean for the general hint
condition (8.6 vs 12.0), that difference was not
significcint.

Thus, hints were effective in improving

performance, at least on old targets.
The performance means for new targets were 24.7, 19.7,
and 22.4, for the no hint, general hint, and specific hint
condition, respectively.

No differences between the three

conditions were significant.

Thus, neither hint supported

transfer to new targets during the first transfer test.
I now turn to the second transfer test.

As in the

first transfer test, the effect of target was significant,
with performance on old targets being superior to
performance on new targets, F(l,118) = 55.34, MSE = 709.2,
p = .0001.

However, the interaction between target level

and hint type was not present at the second transfer test,
I < 1.
Tukey/Kramer pairwise comparisons computed for each
target level revealed that the specific hint condition was
superior to the no hint condition for both old and new
targets.

Thus, participants provided reflective knowledge
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in the form of a specific hint, were able to apply the hint
to the new targets.

The general hint condition did not

differ from either the no hint condition or the specific
hint condition.
Although the new target level is not truly "new" during
the second transfer test (i.e., the new target level was
experienced during the first transfer test), the
superiority of the specific hint condition is surprising.
After all, the specific hints only applied to the old
target level and if followed for the new target would lead
to poor performance.

Apparently, the minimal experience

learners got with the new target during the first transfer
test enabled them to apply the hints to the new targets
during the second transfer test.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
This investigation examined the effects of reflection,
exposing learners to others' ideas about the task, and the
opportunity to discuss those ideas with other learners.

An

additional concern of this investigation was the effect
that reflection would have on the integration of reflective
and experiential knowledge.

In three experiments, the

effectiveness of various kinds of reflective thinking,
involving both within-task and post-task reflection, was
investigated.

Also, two ways of providing learners with

alternative ideas about task behavior, exposure to other's
policies and providing hints for task solution, were
examined.

Following a summary of the basic findings

regarding knowledge integration, possible explanations and
the theoretical implications will be discussed.
Simimarv of Findings

Within-task Reflection
Several methods for eliciting within-task reflection
were investigated.

The simplest method was to give

learners pencil and paper along with instructions to use
them as they saw fit to help them learn the task
(Experiment 3) .

It was expected that pencil and paper

would serve as external memory and lessen the demand for
cognitive resources.

The use of pencil and paper was also

expected to cause participants to "stop and think", or
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perform more reflectively, as they worked (Gagne & Smith,
1962).
Contrary to these expectations, no effect on learning
was found.

Performance and policy quality were the same in

Experiment 3 whether participants had paper and pencil or
not.

This result confirms what others have argued is a

tendency for people to default to an experiential mode when
reflective strategies meet with difficulty (e.g.. Berry &
Dienes, 1993; Reber, 1993).
Another method for eliciting within-task reflection
during task performance was to require participants to
predict the outcome of each selection of workforce size
(prediction condition. Experiment 1).

This method

apparently was successful in eliciting reflection because
the performance of participants in the prediction condition
differed from that of participants in a non-prediction
control condition.

However, this kind of reflection led to

worse rather than better performance.

Thus, forcing

learners to reflect as they learn can actually interfere
with learning.
The final method for eliciting within-task reflection
was assisted reflective practice which involved a computer
program designed to assist learners in thinking about their
policies for controlling sugar production and to help them
evaluate their policies by using them to perform the task
(Experiments 1 and 2).
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Assisted reflective practice was found to be quite
damaging to learning and performance.

The policies created

by learners engaging in assisted reflective practice were
less valid than those of learners not required to reflect
as they practiced.

Also, at the end of training, task

performance was worse following assisted reflective
practice compared to experiential (non-reflective)
practice.
In summary, eliciting within-task reflection failed to
improve learning in every condition investigated in these
experiments.

Contrary to my predictions, within-task

reflection consistently led to worse performance relative
to participants allowed to perform the task experientially.
Further, there was evidence that within-task reflection led
to less valid reflective knowledge.

The simulated policies

of participants in reflective conditions tended to perform
worse than those of participants in experiential
conditions.
That supported reflection could be so detrimental to
learning was unexpected considering the number of studies
finding beneficial effects of a variety of reflective
processes (e.g., Ahlum-Heath & DiVesta, 1986; BerardiColleta et al.,

1995; Biemiller & Meichenbaum, 1992; Chi et

al., 1987, 1994; Gagne & Smith, 1962; Klahr & Dunbar, 1988;
Mathews et al.,

1996; McGeorge & Burton, 1989; Stanley et

al., 1989; Trudel & Payne, 1995; Wilder & Harvey, 1971).
75

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The size aoid robustness of this negative impact of
reflective practice in these experiments justifies the
creation of a name for this phenomenon: reflective
abstraction error.

The theoretical implications of

reflection abstraction error are taken up later in this
discussion.
Post-task Reflection
Two kinds of post-task reflection were investigated.
In one kind, participants wrote down their strategies for
controlling sugar production at the end of each practice
session.

In the other kind of post-task reflection,

participants met periodically in small groups to discuss
their written strategies and create a group policy for
controlling sugar production.
The requirement to write a strategy had no effect on
performance.

However, participation in group discussions

had a significant effect on learning that varied according
to whether within-task reflection was present.

This

interaction effect can be seen by comparing the nominal
groups and group interaction conditions of Experiment 1.
In the nominal groups condition, participants received
copies of the strategies of other group members.

They

were instructed to combine those policies, along with their
own policy, into a single policy.

Then they were

instructed to evaluate this policy during subsequent
practice sessions.

Nominal groups participants were not
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allowed to discuss the policies with the other group
members contributing the policies.

In the group

interaction condition, participants were allowed to see and
evaluate each others policies and to discuss their policies
with the goal of creating the best single group policy for
controlling sugar production.

Thus, they had the greatest

opportunity for reflecting about their own and other's
ideas.
The results showed that when participants were allowed
to discuss their policies with other members, those who had
assisted reflective practice performed much worse than
those who had experiential practice.

By contrast, in the

nominal groups conditions (no group discussion),
performance of those having assisted reflective practice
did not differ from the performance of those having
experiential practice.

In addition, performance of the

group interaction participants who had experiential
practice exceeded that of participants in the nominal
groups/experiential practice condition.

This was the only

condition in which reflection (group discussion) actually
improved task performance.
These results suggest that the effect of post-task
reflection (discussion) depends on the content of the
discussion.

The policies of participants in the

experiential practice conditions contained significantly
more examples of specific situations than the policies of
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participants in the assisted reflective practice
conditions.

Thus, the group discussions of experiential

learners were more focused on specific situations
encountered in the context of the task.
Exposure to Other's Policies
Another variable investigated for its effect on
experiential and reflective knowledge was exposure to
alternative task conceptions.

It was hypothesized that

conceptual change would be most likely to occur when
learners have access to a variety of task conceptions.
Although access to alternative task conceptions,
through exposure to other's policies, was predicted to lead
to superior performance when combined with assisted
reflective practice, it actually had no effect.

In

Experiment 1, there was little difference in performance
between participants who had access only to their own
policies (no exposure condition) and those who were allowed
to evaluate other's policies (nominal groups condition).
This finding suggests either that learners ignore ideas not
generated by themselves or that they are unable to
integrate those ideas into their own conception of the
task.

The lack of correlation (r=-.02) between performance

and policy quality in the nominal groups condition suggests
that participants were unable to integrate the policies of
others with their own experiential knowledge.

That is,

their experiential knowledge, which controlled task
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performance, became dissociated from their reflective
knowledge which was influenced by exposure to others
policies.
However, when groups of participants were allowed to
discuss each others policies the dissociation between
experiential and reflective knowledge was eliminated.

That

is, in the group discussion conditions, experiential and
reflective knowledge were significantly correlated and were
affected similarly by manipulations of practice mode
(experiential vs reflective practice) .

Further, combining

group discussion with exposure to other's policies actually
facilitated task performance for participants practicing
experientially.
Giving Learners Valid Hints
Only when participants were given valid hints about
controlling sugar production (Experiment 2) did assisted
reflective practice not significantly interfere with
learning.

Learners given hints about how to control sugar

production performed near perfect by the final session and
there was no difference in performance between experiential
and assisted reflective practice,

i^parently, when within-

task reflection is directed toward valid cases

(hints), the

damaging effect of reflective practice is eliminated, or at
least greatly reduced.

However, even though performance

was not negatively affected, learners performing assisted
reflective practice still tended to develop less valid
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mental models as indicated by their poorer quality
policies.
Giving learners hints also provided an opportunity to
investigate the relative transfer of reflective knowledge
provided in the hints, and experiential knowledge acquired
from task experience.

Experiential knowledge is commonly

viewed as being inflexible and tied to specific perceptual
cues (Berry & Dienes, 1993; Schacter, 1987) .

In

particular, positive transfer to new situations in the
sugar production task is rare (Dienes & Fahey, 1995) .

By

contrast, reflective knowledge is generally viewed as
flexible and applicable to novel situations (Baars, 1988) .
The results of Experiment 3 suggest that this view may be
too strong.
In Experiment 3, at the beginning of the second
practice session, some participants were given hints
specifying the correct response for four different
situations.

Those hints were valid for the target level

used during practice sessions.

However, at the final

session the target level was changed for the transfer test,
thereby rendering the specific content of the hints (e.g.,
if production is 3000 then use 400 workers) invalid.
Clearly, participants could not literally apply the hints
to perform the transfer test.

They had to abstract or

adapt this knowledge in order to apply it to the new target
level.

Thus, this transfer test taps a very abstract level
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of knowledge, or at the least, measures the use of abstract
analogy during test.
In the first transfer test, participants given the
hints performed no better on new targets than participants
in the no-hint control condition.

This suggests that

reflective knowledge (i.e., knowledge acquired from hints)
did not facilitate transfer.

However, performance on new

targets in both the hint and no-hint conditions was still
better than chance performance.

This suggests that the

experiential knowledge learners gained from task experience
did transfer to the new target level.
After a brief retention interval, during which all
participants' written policies and notes were taken away, a
second transfer test was given using the same new target
levels as

for the first transfer test.

Of course, the new

target levels are no longer truly new as they were seen
during the earlier transfer test.

However, participants

had only minimal experience (20 trials) with the new
targets.
Interestingly, during the second transfer test,
participants that had received the specific hints performed
better on

newtargets than the no-hint condition.

Remember,these hints were not literally valid for
targets.

new

Apparently, the minimal experience that

participants received with the new targets during the first
transfer test was sufficient for them to modify their
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reflective knowledge auid integrate it with their
experiential knowledge, increasing their performance on the
second transfer test.

By contrast, participants who

received only general hints (i.e., hints not referring to
specific target levels) performed no better than no-hint
controls on the second transfer test.
Knowledge Integration
Several investigations using the sugar production task
and similar tasks have reported dissociations between
experiential and reflective knowledge (e.g.. Berry &
Broadbent, 1984, 1988; Stanley et al., 1989).

One of the

questions addressed in this investigation was whether
engaging reflective thinking in the context of performing
the task would lead to greater integration (less
dissociation) of experiential and reflective knowledge.
The results of these experiments suggest that
integration is most likely to occur when two conditions are
met:

1) Reflection occurs following task performance in

the context of discussions with other learners about
performing the task.

2) Reflection is focused on specific

cases or direct experiences rather than abstracted theories
or beliefs about the task.

When these two conditions are

not met, either performance will suffer, or dissociation
will occur.
The evidence for condition 1 was the consistently poor
performance of participants in the assisted reflective
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practice conditions relative to experiential practice,
which contrasts with the good relative performance obtained
in the group interaction/experiential practice condition of
Experiment 1.

Support for condition 2 was that the

policies containing the most specific situations were
associated with the best performance.

Additionally,

transfer performance was better in the specific hint
condition relative to the general hint condition.
Explaining Reflective Abstraction Error
Reflective abstraction error is defined as the tendency
to seek, find, and believe in simple rules or explanations
of one's own task performance that may be grossly
inadequate.

Reflective abstraction error was manifested

through three basic findings.

First, reflecting within-

task about one's model of the task (assisted reflective
practice), or merely thinking ahead about the results of
one's actions

(prediction task), significantly reduced the

degree of learning as indicated by task performance.
Second, the mental models (written policies) of
participants who reflected as they learned tended to be
less valid and less specific than the mental models of
experiential learners.

Third, experiential and reflective

knowledge tended to become dissociated when reflection
occurred within-task and alternative ideas (other's
policies in Experiment 1, or valid hints in Experiment 2)
are provided to learners.
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These findings are generally consistent with those
reported in the literature on implicit learning of
artificial grammars.

Learners studying letter-strings

generated by an artificial grammar under instruction to
discover the rules of the grammar (reflective learning)
tend to perform worse on a subsequent discrimination test
than do learners instructed only to memorize the letterstrings (experiential learning).

Rule-search instructions

seem to cause learners to misclassify consistently some
nongrammatical strings as grammatical (Brooks, 1978; Reber,
1976; Reber et al., 1980), indicating that they are
following

invalid rules.

Given that the rules of most artificial grammars are
very complex and learners are given no feedback about the
correctness of their developing rules, it is not surprising
that they should fail to discover completely valid rules
(Brehmer, 1980).

However, the reflective practice

procedure used in the current investigation was devised
specifically to help learners discover the rules governing
the sugar production task.

They were allowed periodically

to write down their rules.

Additionally, they were given

feedback about the overall quality of their written rules.
Finally, eind most important, they were required, under
conditions of assisted reflective practice, to evaluate
their rules by following those rules as they controlled
sugar production.

Incredibly, all of this support
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contributed to poorer quality written policies which are
evidence of less valid reflective knowledge.

This support

for reflection also contributed to poorer task performance.
Reflection abstraction error apparently can be
prevented as demonstrated by Mathews et al.

(1996).

Contrary to the findings reported here, Mathews et al.
(1996) found a large positive effect of reflective practice
on both reflective knowledge (policy quality) cind
performance using the same sugar production task and a
reflective practice condition very similar to that employed
in this study.

The reason for the very different results

in the two studies is most likely to be found in
differences in the reflective practice procedures used in
the two studies.
In the Mathews et al.

(1996) study, policy feedback

comprised both a global score indicating overall policy
quality and information concerning the relative
effectiveness of individual policy statements or rules.

In

effect, the scored policies returned to the participants at
the beginning of a session in Mathews et al.

(1996) were

somewhat like the hints given participants in Experiments 2
and 3 in the current investigation.
generally specific cases.

Good rules were

Thus, the feedback pointed to

these good specific rules that subjects included in their
policies.

Recall that the specific hints significantly

improved performance and reflective knowledge.
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The reflective practice procedure of Mathews et al.
(1996) also instructed participants about which of their
rules "best" applied in each situation during reflective
practice.

In a way, the simulation served somewhat as an

expert coach guiding a student through the just the right
actions at just the right time (Ericsson et al., 1993)
during reflective practice.
In the current investigation, policies were returned to
participants with a single score indicating the validity of
the policy as a whole.

Participants were not informed

about the relative quality of individual rules or
statements in their policies.

Also, they were not guided

as to which rule to apply during practice.
method and outcome between Mathews et al.

The contrast in
(1996) and the

experiments in the current investigation suggest that a key
to thwarting reflective abstraction error is to keep
reflection focused on specific experiences with the task.
When learners are reflecting on their experiences with the
sugar production task and not on their abstract theories or
beliefs about the task, they are successful.
The performance of participants in the group
interaction conditions of experiment 1 provides the
strongest evidence for the importance of keeping reflection
focused on task experiences.

In those conditions, assisted

reflective practice was most damaging; learners practicing
reflectively performed much worse than those practicing
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experientially.

More important, there was a striking

difference between the written policies of the two
conditions.

Policies of learners having experiential

practice tended to be lists of highly valid and specific
situations (e.g., "when production is at 3000 tons, always
use 500 workers").

By contrast, policies of learners

having assisted reflective practice contained few
references to specific situations.

The only difference in

procedure between the two conditions was the mode of
practice (reflective vs experiential).

Therefore, it could

be that practice mode was completely responsible for the
differences in performance.

However, the written policies

were qualitatively different in the two conditions.
Consequently, during the group discussion periods,
discussion was focused on different kinds of knowledge.

It

is possible that the differences in performance were due to
this difference in discussion content.

When discussion was

focused on specific or concrete situations (e.g., in the
experiential condition) performance benefitted.

By

contrast, when discussions were focused on general rules,
performance suffered.

This possibility is supported by the

finding of Experiment 2 in which performance under
reflective practice conditions was good when learners were
given hints containing specific cases.

That is, reflecting

on one's possibly flawed understanding of the task while
one l e a m s can have a detrimental impact on understanding.
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This negative impact of reflective practice is contrary
to what is typically found in studies of problem solving
and transfer (Ahlum-Heath & DiVesta, 1986; Berry, 1983; Chi
et al., 1989; Gagne & Smith, 1962; Wilder & Harvey, 1971).
Good problem solvers are more likely to exhibit spontaneous
use of metacognitive strategies in which they reflect on
what they know or don't know and evaluate the success of
their activities (Biemiller & Meichenbaum, 1992; Chi et
al., 1987; Chi et al., 1994).

Requiring solvers to justify

or explain each step toward solution also has been found to
facilitate problem solving (Berardi-Colleta et al., 1995;
Chi et al., 1994).
An exception to this positive effect of reflective
processing is found within a particular class of problems
known as insight problems

(Wertheimer, 1959).

These are

problems which have a high probability of leading to an
impasse and whose solution is usually associated with an
"ah ha" experience in which the solver suddenly obtains the
solution (Schooler, Ohlsson, & Brooks, 1993).
al.

Schooler et

(1993) found that a requirement to think aloud while

working on insight problems reduced the likelihood of
arriving at the correct solution.

Their explanation of

this result is that verbalization activates loiowledge and
processes that overshadow the nonverbal processes necessary
for insight to occur.
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Can "overshadowing" explain the negative effect of
reflective practice?

The main difficulty with this account

is that the sugar production task does not have the central
attribute of an insight problem.

Insight problems are

characterized by the sudden appearance of a solution.

In

the sugar production task insight should reveal itself in
the form of discontinuous learning curves for individual
learners.

However, improvements in performance tend to be

incremental for the sugar production task.

Thus, insight

does not describe the solution process in the sugar
production task.
One might explain reflective abstraction error as the
inevitable result of attempting to understand one's
experience in the face of unreliable input.

For example,

it has been suggested that the poor quality of clinical
judgment, as compared with other ençirically based
approaches to judgment, follows from a combination of the
unrepresentativeness of the cases experienced, a lack of
timely and accurate feedback about one's judgments, and
biases people have which prevent them from properly
evaluating the evidence of their experiences

(Brehmer,

1980; Camerer & Johnson, 1991; Klayman & Ha, 1985; Tversky
& Kahneman, 1973).

That is, the less than stellar

performance of human judges and decision makers is the best
they can do in a noisy environment.
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This diagnosis is most certainly correct.

The problems

of representativeness of experiences and paucity amd
reliability of feedback are evident (Brehmer, 1980).

Also,

people's biases have been well documented (Kahneman,
Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Klayman & Ha, 1985; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1982) .

However, the implication of this

diagnosis is that the poor performance of human judges is
due to an adaptive agent (human learner) being faced with
an environment that is ill-structured.

Thus, the fact that

the learner ends up not well adapted to the task
environment should not be conceived as an error but as the
best solution in the absence of good "data” .
An important question to ask at this point is whether
the sugar production task is just this sort of illstructured task?

The answer is, it is not.

Feedback in

the sugar production task is immediate and accurate, with a
small exception made for the noise added to output.

This

suggests that reflective abstraction error is a response to
something other than an ill-structured and noisy
environment.
Perhaps the key to understanding the negative effect of
reflective practice in the sugar production task is the
nonlinear relation between number of workers used and sugar
production.

People tend to seek simple positive

relationships between task variables (Hammond & Summers,
1965; Sanderson, 1989; Sniezek, 1986).

Participants
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reasonably expect that increasing the size of the workforce
will always raise the level of production and similarly
that using fewer workers will always lower the production
level.

That is, they assume a simple causative model in

which each worker produces some fixed quantity of sugar
(Sanderson, 1989).

In fact, the relationship between

production level and workforce size is more complex.

The

effect of changing the workforce will vary as a function of
the production level achieved on the previous trial.

An

increase in the size of the workforce will sometimes raise
production and sometimes lower production.

As can be

verified from the equation relating workers and production,
production level will increase only when the number of
workers selected is greater than one tenth of the current
production level.

For example, assume that on a trial the

production level is 5000 tons and the current workforce
size is 300.

An increase of workers to 350 would lower

production because 350 is less than one tenth of 5000.
Assuming that 350 workers are selected, the resulting
production would be 2000 (disregarding the random element) .
Then if workers are increased again, to 400 workers,
production level will now increase because 400 is greater
than one tenth of 2000.
Learners required to reflect as they practice are
apparently unable to discard this common sense model of the
sugar production task.

Even when faced with feedback that
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challenges the model (e.g., when an increase in workers
leads to a decrease in production level) learners are
apparently unable to change their representation of the
task (e.g., Luchins, 1942).

Perhaps the common sense model

is protected from evidential challenges through the
formation of exception rules that account for those
situations in which the siitç)le model fails (e.g., Holland
et al., 198G).

Or, similarly, perhaps the simple model

persists through a self-perpetuating encoding process in
which all ambiguous or contrary evidence is interpreted as
being consistent with the model (Lewicki, Czyzewska, &
Hill, 1997) .
Regardless of whether learners come to the task with
strong beliefs that conflict with the task or they adopt
those beliefs in the absence of a better model, the
conditions of assisted reflective practice may strongly
activate one's mental model.

Once activated, it influences

one’s interpretation of experience and thereby can lead to
the abstraction of knowledge that is inconsistent with the
task (e.g., Lewicki et al., 1997).
Feltovich, Spiro, and Coulson (1989) argue that people
engage in a number of "conceptual biases" when faced with
learning very complex material.

These conceptual biases

refer to tendencies to simplify complex concepts during
acquisition.

For example, when faced with comprehending a

system with many interacting variables, one tends to focus
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on one or two variables at a time and attempt to put the
system back together after all of the parts are understood.
Unfortunately, when interactions are present, this can lead
to a misunderstanding of the complete system.

Thus,

Feltovich et al. argue, misconceptions arise as a natural
result of attempting to understand a complex system.
Further, the misconceptions arise out of actions that the
learner takes to reduce the complexity.
It is not clear that this kind of analysis task
complexity applies to the sugar production task (c.f.,
Hayes & Broadbent, 1988) .

Although some authors have

referred to this task as a complex system (e.g., Broadbent
et al., 1986), its complexity is not due to large numbers
of interacting variables.

Its workings are very simple and

learners receive immediate and accurate feedback about
their performance.

Whatever complexity it exhibits is due

to violations of learners' expectations in terms of the
kinds of relations that they seek (e.g., Hammond & Summers,
1965; Sniezek, 1986).

Thus, the difficulties that learners

have are not due to any intrinsic complexity of the task,
but rather to the "perceived" complexity and an
incongruence between their expectations and the actual
behavior of the system.
Implications
The results of this investigation suggest that the best
way to support reflection for novices beginning to learn a
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difficult task, and thereby prevent or reduce reflective
abstraction error, is to direct their reflection toward the
concrete data of experience with the task rather than the
conjectures of their theories about the task.

Experience,

and our memories of it, are richer in detail than any
theories of the phenomena producing the experience.

Also,

experiential knowledge does not seem to be so biased toward
simple relations between variables.

Thus, experiential

practice followed by post-task discussion may provide the
inductive base necessary to counter wayward theory
(Brehmer, 1980; Mathews et al., 1989).
This prescription for combating reflective abstraction
error is consistent with descriptions of the developmental
process which one must follow to advance in many skills.
For example, first language acquisition is certainly a case
where substantial experience precedes the acquisition of
valid reflective knowledge.

The difficulties faced by

adults when learning a second language may occur in part
because they already have a language model (i.e., grammar)
and the cognitive capacity to reflect on that model as they
experience the new language (e.g., Johnson & Newport,
1989).

Certainly adults have much more sophisticated

theories about grammars than do children.

Possibly,

children with their more limited cognitive capacity are
less able to reflect on the input.
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In a similar vein. Bloom’s (1985) discussion of
exceptional performers in skills ranging from music to
athletics suggests that the childhood experiences of all
exceptional performers are characterized by play and
exploration in their chosen skill for no other reason than
their own enjoyment.

Formal structured study typically

comes much later in their development.
The importance of the theories learners bring, or don't
bring, to any learning situation is most strongly apparent
in the literature on misconceptions, or alternative
conceptions (Wandersee et al., 1994), in science education.
The difficulty students have in learning subjects such as
simple mechanics (e.g., Caramazza, McCloskey, & Green,
1980; diSessa, 1982; McDermott, 1984), electricity (e.g.,
Cohen, Eylon, & Ganiel, 1983; Heller, 1987), or the nature
of matter (e.g., Novick & Nussbaum, 1978; Wandersee, 1983),
has been found to be related to the conceptions they bring
to the classroom and how those conceptions interact with
the scientific concepts to be learned (Osborne, Bell, &
Gilbert, 1983).

The theories students bring to the

classroom can lead to suboptimal learning outcomes.
One's natural response to the difficulties of these
students is to challenge their concepts directly.

However,

the results of this investigation suggest that directly
engaging people's reflective knowledge can lead to
reflective abstraction error, unless their reflection is
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directed toward discussion of experiential knowledge, or it
is guided by an external source that can reinforce correct
choice and application of reflective rules.
Future Directions for Research
The strong negative intact of reflective practice
reported in these experiments requires replication.

This

is particularly important considering the contrast between
the current findings and those of Mathews et al.

(1996) in

which reflective practice, combined with group discussion,
led to superior performance. A logical follow-up would
compare the two methods within a single experiment.

An

importcuit variable to investigate in such a replication
would be the type of feedback learners receive about their
reflective knowledge (i.e., their written policies).
A possible limitation of this study is the reliance on
the sugar production task.

One could argue that Reflective

Abstraction Error is limited to situations where there is
an incongruence between the cover story describing the
system (sugar production) and the actual behavior of the
system.

This limitation could be addressed in a couple of

ways.
One way to address this limitation would be to
investigate the effect of different cover stories (e.g.,
the 'person control task", Stanley et al, 1989) varying in
their degree of congruence with task behavior.

Possibly,

96

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reflection Abstraction Error would be systematically
related to this variable.
Another possibility would be to select less artificial
tasks.

Two such examples are the city transportation task

of Broadbent et al.

(1986) and the simulated economic

system used by Broadbent and Aston (1978).

Finding

Reflective Abstraction Error in tasks such as these would
support the generalization of these findings beyond the
laboratory.
The strong negative effects of reflective practice
reported in this investigation might challenge one's faith
in thoughtful reflection.

However, we should find comfort

in Schumacher's observation that more experiential ways of
knowing can guide us in our journey.
Yet a man who uses an imaginary map, thinking that it
is a true one, is likely to be worse off than someone
with no map at all; for he will fail to inquire
whenever he can, to observe every detail on his way,
and to search continuously with all his senses and all
his intelligence for indications of where he should go.
(E. F. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful)
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APPENDIX A
COMPUTER SIMULATION PROCEDURES
The primary purpose of the simulation program was to
eliminate the subjectivity involved in selecting from a
policy the most appropriate rule to apply on each trial.
To that end, each policy was translated into a set of ifthen rules (e.g., "if production is above target then use
fewer workers") .

The rules were submitted to a computer

program that performed the same 40-trial test as performed
by experimental participants.
Translation of Policies into Rules
Every attempt was made to translate every statement
contained in each policy into a rule for selecting
workforce size.
then <action>.

Each rule was of the form: if <conditions>
Conditions could be auiy proposition about

the state of the sugar production system.

Conditions could

refer to prior states (e.g., "if 400 workers were used on
the previous two trials and production increased then...").
However, conditions were not allowed which referred to
states that occurred in a prior block of ten trials.
Because participants often stated rules with no condition
(e.g., "use 600 workers"), empty conditions were allowed.
For example, the rule above would be translated as "if <>
then use 600 workers".
The actions of rules were allowed to be single values
(e.g., use 350 workers") or lists or ranges of values.
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This was necessary because policy statements often referred
to workforce sizes in relative (e.g., "more") or abstract
(e.g., "low") terms.

When translating statements into

rules, these cases were handled in the following way:

(a)

"more, or less, workers than X" was interpreted as a
randomly selected value of workers between X and the
maximum or minimum number of workers allowed, respectively;
(b) "a high, or

low, number of workers" was taken to mean

a randomly selected number of workers above 750 or below
450 respectively; and (c) "an increasing, or decreasing,
number of workers" was interpreted the same as in (a) .
On occasion, participants would include mathematical
formulas into the condition of a rule.

Whenever possible,

these formulas were translated into procedures that would
check the state of the sugar production system to determine
if the condition was satisfied.

Similarly, the actions of

rules sometimes were in the form of formulas (e.g., "if
<action> then <take current production level and divide by
10 to get worker level>").

In this case, the action was

translated into procedure that would output a list of one
or more values for workforce size.
Simulation Procedure
The same 40-trial test performed by all participants
was used as the simulation task.

On each trial of the

simulated task, all rules whose conditions are satisfied
are first identified.

Each rule then casts one vote for
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each possible workforce size implicated by its action.

For

example, if the rule "if <production is low> then <use more
than 600 workers>" had its condition satisfied, then it
would cast one vote each for 650, 700, 750, 800,...1200
workers.

The actual number of workers chosen on that trial

is simply the number of workers receiving the most votes.
On trials where no rules applied (their conditions were
not satisfied), the workforce size from the previous trial
was repeated.

When no rule applied on the first trial of a

block, a random value was chosen for workforce size.
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APPENDIX B
REPEATED-MEASURES ANALYSIS OF PERFORMANCE IN EXPERIMENT 1

Source

df

SS

MS

F

Between subjects
Mode

1

1502.1

1502.1

Exposure

2

4036.8

2.0

0.01

Mode X Exposure

2

402.8

201.4

1.46

109

15022.2

137.8

Session

2

3112.4

1556.2

37.44*

Session X Mode

2

746.1

373.0

8.98*

Session X Exposure

4

91.9

23.0

0.55

Session X Mode X Exposure

4

275.3

68.8

1.66

218

9060.5

41.6

Error(between)

10.90*

Within subjects

Error(within)
'^p<.05.
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APPENDIX C
ANALYSIS OF FINAL TEST PERFORMANCE IN EXPERIMENT 1

Source

df

SS

MS

Mode

1

1411.1

1411.1

Exposure

2

33.1

16.5

Mode X Exposure

2

562.4

281.2

109

9580.4

87.9

Error
*p<.05.
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F
16.05*
0.19
3.20*

APPENDIX D
ANALYSIS OF FINAL POLICY QUALITY IN EXPERIMENT 1

Source

df

SS

MS

F
10.06*

Mode

1

1067.4

1067.4

Exposure

2

340.7

170.4

1.61

Mode X Exposure

2

1223.3

611.6

5.76*

109

11569.9

106.1

Error
^p<. 05,
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APPENDIX E
ANALYSIS OF CONTROL GROUPS IN EXPERIMENT 1

Source
Treatment
Error

df

SS

2

1269.1

57

5984.9

MS

F

634.6

6.04*

105.0

Note. Treatment groups contained in this analysis were:
practice-only, predict-only, and no exposure/ experiential
*p<.05.
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APPENDIX F
REPEATED-MEASURES ANALYSIS OF PERFORMANCE IN EXPERIMENT 2

Source

df

SS

MS

I

Between subjects
2

3248.8

1624.4

49

8928.9

182.2

Session

2

7575.7

3787.8

93.34*

Session X Treatment

4

1364.7

341.2

8.41*

98

3977.1

40.6

Treatment
Error(between)

8.91*

Within subjects

Error(within)
^p<.05.
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APPENDIX G
ANALYSIS OF FINAL TEST PERFORMANCE IN EXPERIMENT 2

Source
Treatment
Error

df

SS

MS

2

2019.3

1009.6

49

4331.7

88.4

*p<.05.
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F
11.42*

APPENDIX H
ANALYSIS OF FINAL POLICY QUALITY IN EXPERIMENT 2

Source
Treatment
Error

df

SS

MS

2

3022.6

1511.3

49

7143.0

145.8

*p<.05.
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F
10.37*

APPENDIX I
REPEATED-MEASURES ANALYSIS OF PERFORMANCE IN EXPERIMENT 3

Source

df

SS

MS

Between subjects
Mode

1

34.4

34.4

0.25

Hint

2

1993.9

996.9

7.13*

Mode X Hint

2

113.9

56.9

115

16087.6

139.9

Session

2

4820.9

2410.5

Session X Mode

2

64.4

32.2

Session X Hint

4

907.7

226.9

Session X Mode X Hint

4

119.2

29.8

230

9101.3

39.6

Error(between)

0.41

Within subjects

Error(within)
^p<.05.
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60.92*
0.81
5.73*
0.75

APPENDIX J
ANALYSIS OF FINAL TEST PERFORMANCE IN EXPERIMENT 3

Source

df

SS

MS

I
0.06

Mode

1

3.5

3.5

Hint

2

769.8

384.9

Mode X Hint

2

6.9

3.5

115

6685.2

58.1

Error
*p<.05.

117

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

6.62*
0.06

APPENDIX K
ANALYSIS OF FINAL POLICY QUALITY IN EXPERIMENT 3

Source

df

SS

MS

F

Mode

1

34.3

34.3

0.22

Hint

2

85.5

42.7

0.27

Mode X Hint

2

259.0

129.5

0.82

115

18101.3

157.4

Error
*p<.05.
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